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ARTICLES 
NATIONAL SECURITY FEDERALISM IN THE 
AGE OF TERROR 
Matthew C. Waxman* 
National security law scholarship tends to focus on the balancing of security 
and liberty, and the overwhelming bulk of that scholarship is about such balanc-
ing on the horizontal axis among branches at the federal level. This Article chal-
lenges that standard focus by supplementing it with an account of the vertical 
axis and the emergent, post-9/11 role of state and local government in American 
national security law and policy. It argues for a federalism frame that emphasizes 
vertical intergovernmental arrangements for promoting and mediating a dense 
array of policy values over the long term. This federalism frame helps in under-
standing the cooperation and tension between the federal and local governments 
with respect to counterterrorism and national security intelligence, and also 
yields insights to guide reform of those relationships. The Article emphasizes two 
important values that have been neglected in the sparse scholarship on local gov-
ernment and national security functions: (1) accountability and the ways vertical 
intergovernmental arrangements enhance or degrade it, and (2) efficiency and 
the ways those arrangements promote public policy effectiveness. This Article re-
veals the important policy benefits of our shared federal-local national security 
system, and it suggests ways to better capture these benefits, especially if terror-
ism threats evolve to include a greater domestic component. 
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 INTRODUCTION 
National security law scholarship tends to focus on the balancing of securi-
ty and liberty, and the overwhelming bulk of that scholarship is about such ba-
lancing at the federal level. That is, scholarship about national security institu-
tional architecture focuses almost entirely on horizontal allocations, or relations 
among coordinate branches of the federal government, with an eye ultimately 
toward how those horizontal arrangements strike and enforce substantive liber-
ty-security balances.1 
This Article challenges that common focus by supplementing it with an ac-
count of the vertical axis: “national security federalism.” It shows that the near-
 
 1. See, e.g., Samuel Issacharoff & Richard H. Pildes, Between Civil Libertarianism 
and Executive Unilateralism: An Institutional Process Approach to Rights During Wartime, 
5 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 1 (2004); Mark Tushnet, Controlling Executive Power in the 
War on Terrorism, 118 HARV. L. REV. 2673 (2005). 
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exclusive concentration of contemporary national security law scholarship on 
horizontal relationships among the federal branches is too limited because sig-
nificant, tangible effects of security policies on liberty and many other interests 
today take place at the local level as a result of actions by local government ac-
tors.2 Consider, for example, intelligence gathering related to combating terror-
ism. There are more than 700,000 local police officers from about 17,000 state 
and local law enforcement agencies who may conduct relevant activities3 such 
as surveillance, profiling-based investigation, and data collection and sharing.4 
If an individual is being watched as a potential terrorism threat because of his 
appearance, it may be a local officer watching.5 If a government agent is look-
ing around a mosque and asking questions of members, it may be a local 
cop.6 If data are being mined for suspicious patterns, local officials may have 
collected and passed on some of that data.7 Most of this activity is done in the 
service of broad local law enforcement and policing mandates. Critically, how-
ever, it also contributes to a national security policy principally led by the fed-
eral government.8 
These activities, moreover, are governed by a complex web of law: not just 
federal law, but also state statutes and state constitutional doctrine, municipal 
legislation and regulations, judicial consent decrees, and state and local admin-
istrative guidelines. For example, some municipal police departments’ investi-
gatory powers are limited by state law and some by locally set administrative 
guidelines.9 Those investigatory powers are overseen by a variety of institu-
tional mechanisms, including state and local legislatures, agency oversight 
boards, external audits, and courts.10 Local law enforcement agencies vary in 
 
 2. See William J. Stuntz, Local Policing After the Terror, 111 YALE L.J. 2137, 2139 
(2002). 
 3. See MARK A. RANDOL, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R40901, TERRORISM INFORMATION 
SHARING AND THE NATIONWIDE SUSPICIOUS ACTIVITY REPORT INITIATIVE: BACKGROUND AND 
ISSUES FOR CONGRESS 3 (2009). 
 4. See William Bloss, Escalating U.S. Police Surveillance After 9/11: An Examina-
tion of Causes and Effects, 4 SURVEILLANCE & SOC’Y 208 (2007). 
 5. See Nick Madigan, Spying Uncovered, BALT. SUN, July 18, 2008, at 1A. 
 6. See Andrea Elliott, As Police Watch for Terrorists, Brooklyn Muslims Feel the 
Eyes, N.Y. TIMES, May 27, 2006, at A1. 
 7. See Robert O’Harrow Jr., Centers Tap into Personal Databases; State Groups 
Were Formed After 9/11, WASH. POST, Apr. 2, 2008, at A1. 
 8. See generally Matthew C. Waxman, Police and National Security: American Local 
Law Enforcement and Counterterrorism After 9/11, 3 J. NAT’L SECURITY L. & POL’Y 377 
(2009) (discussing challenges arising from greater state and local involvement in protecting 
national security). 
 9. See Paul G. Chevigny, Politics and Law in the Control of Local Surveillance, 69 
CORNELL L. REV. 735 (1984); David E. Kaplan, Spies Among Us, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., 
May 8, 2006, at 41, 44. 
 10. See Mary M. Cheh, Legislative Oversight of Police: Lessons Learned from an In-
vestigation of Police Handling of Demonstrations in Washington, D.C., 32 J. LEGIS. 1, 1 
(2005). 
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how they codify and apply guidelines to regulate collection, use, dissemination, 
and retention of data related to counterterrorism.11 Most, but not all, states have 
electronic surveillance statutes, covering different types of communications and 
regulated by different standards and processes.12 And racial and ethnic profil-
ing is regulated by states and many local governments through a combination 
of legislation, court decisions, and administrative guidelines.13 
This is not by any means to deny the predominance of federal national se-
curity law and policy, on account of the massive resources and capabilities of 
the federal government and the primacy of federal law in this context. Rather, it 
is to point out that subfederal law and institutions in many cases affect daily 
lives of individuals more directly and in different ways across jurisdictions. The 
result is an uneven, textured legal and policy landscape with regard to national 
security. 
The federalism frame emphasizes vertical relations and institutional ar-
rangements between federal and state or local governments for promoting and 
mediating policy values over the long term, and produces the uneven, textured 
legal and policy landscape. I argue that this frame yields insights to guide re-
finement of the emergent national security intelligence architecture. I emphas-
ize two important values that have been neglected or undertheorized in existing 
scholarship with respect to local national security functions: (1) accountability 
and the way vertical intergovernmental arrangements enhance or degrade it, 
and (2) efficiency and the way those arrangements promote public policy effec-
tiveness. In those respects my account reveals important potential benefits of 
our shared federal-local national security system, and offers ways to enhance 
these values, especially if terrorism threats evolve to include a greater domestic 
component.  
I assume throughout this Article that state and local governments will con-
tinue to play a significant role in national security intelligence. Not only is this 
a political, practical, and historically contingent reality, but harnessing state and 
local institutions for national security is needed to address parts of the national 
security challenge for which those institutions are much better suited than the 
federal government could ever be.  
A major theme running through the Article, however, is that to the extent 
state and local governments continue playing a major role in the emergent na-
tional security architecture, such that some national security intelligence will be 
 
 11. See K. JACK RILEY ET AL., STATE AND LOCAL INTELLIGENCE IN THE WAR ON 
TERRORISM 31 (2005). 
 12. See Electronic Surveillance Laws, NAT’L CONF. ST. LEGISLATURES, http://www 
.ncsl.org/IssuesResearch/TelecommunicationsInformationTechnology/ElectronicSurveillanc
eLaws/tabid/13492/Default.aspx (last updated Aug. 29, 2010), for a survey of these state 
laws. 
 13. For a compilation of state and local law regarding racial profiling that illustrates 
this variation, see Racial Profiling: The State of the Law, POLICE FOUND. (Mar. 2005), 
http://www.policefoundation.org/pdf/racialprofilingDelete.pdf. 
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decentralized, there remains a large question as to what degree these functions 
will be localized. By “decentralized” I mean a managerial concept, whereby 
policy is set at the top but executed at a local level with some limited discretion 
about how best to do so. Even countries with powerful national police forces 
like France and Israel may delegate implementation of some counterterrorism 
intelligence or investigation functions to lower levels of command.14 By “loca-
lized,” I emphasize instead an agenda-setting role in law and policy, whereby 
state or local entities need not accept the federal policy entirely but are allowed 
some room to vary that policy as they choose. To some extent, distinctions be-
tween decentralization and localization15 blur in the national security intelli-
gence context, because so much of the policy is implementation discretion: we 
care a lot—from both a legal and policy perspective—about the details of how, 
to what extent, and with what sort of oversight government agencies and agents 
collect, analyze, and share information. Nevertheless, the analytic distinction is 
useful in thinking about those important legal and policy decisions that could 
be taken at several levels of government—such as how widely to cast the gov-
ernment’s authority to collect and compile information on individuals or 
groups, or how tightly to constrain and monitor the government’s authority to 
comb through and retain data on individuals. 
In that light, a descriptive goal of this Article is to show that significant na-
tional security localism continues to exist in the United States, despite some 
countervailing pressures, and to help explain why and how it operates. A pre-
scriptive goal is to better understand in what specific contexts such localism 
should be celebrated, and how vertical intergovernmental relations might better 
be structured to harness it in advancing simultaneously a range of policy priori-
ties. This Article does not focus on the first-order question of whether national 
security federalism or localism would be optimal compared to sweepingly dif-
ferent constitutional structures if we were drafting from scratch, such as radi-
cally centralizing police powers related to national security. Instead, this Article 
accepts some vertical division of power as given in the United States—as his-
torically determined to a large degree by foundational constitutional compro-
 
 14. David H. Bayley & David Weisburd, Cops and Spooks: The Role of the Police in 
Counterterrorism, in TO PROTECT AND TO SERVE: POLICING IN AN AGE OF TERRORISM 81, 86 
(David Weisburd et al. eds., 2009). 
 15. I borrow and modify here the definitions used by Edward Rubin and Malcolm Fee-
ley. See Edward L. Rubin & Malcolm Feeley, Federalism: Some Notes on a National Neuro-
sis, 41 UCLA L. REV. 903, 910-14 (1994). As they explain, “[F]ederalism allows the states 
to vary as they choose, pursuing their own policies instead of the national one. This can be 
justified only by arguments favoring a variety of policies, not by arguments favoring the im-
plementation of a single policy by a variety of methods.” Id. at 914. I use here the term “lo-
calism” rather than their “federalism” because I am primarily interested in actions at the mu-
nicipal level. Roderick Hills draws a similar distinction between “managerial 
decentralization” and “democratic decentralization.” See Roderick M. Hills, Jr., Is Federal-
ism Good for Localism? The Localist Case for Federal Regimes, 21 J.L. & POL. 187, 192 
(2005). 
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mises, even if also driven by some contemporary policy imperatives—and asks 
how we can make the most of that basic structure. Much more empirical re-
search in this area is needed,16 so the specific policy conclusions are necessari-
ly tentative, but this Article can help guide further work. 
In terms of substantive focus, this Article homes in on intelligence issues, 
which are just one element of national security policy, and puts aside some oth-
er significant elements such as disaster response. Intelligence is an area in 
which federal and state or local governments have significant resources and le-
gal powers that raise especially salient civil liberties concerns and that overlap 
with other core local government responsibilities. While those factors make in-
telligence a fruitful case study of national security federalism generally, they 
also give rise to some distinct intergovernmental dynamics. Moreover, whereas 
most federalism discussion focuses on federal-state relations,17 this Article fo-
cuses largely on federal-local relations and mostly groups state and local gov-
ernments together. This is not to deny important differences in the way state 
and local governments may view national security matters or the public func-
tions that affect security and liberty,18 or the role state governments play in 
managing federal-local programs.19 Rather, the focus here is on the relationship 
between federal and subfederal governments, especially law enforcement agen-
cies, to highlight the vertical dimension of national security law as an important 
axis. 
Part I of this Article argues that it no longer makes sense, if it ever did, to 
think of national security intelligence as an exclusive federal responsibility. It 
describes how contemporary terrorism threats have pushed some responsibility 
for particular national security functions—especially information collection, 
analysis, and sharing—down to state and local levels, and it situates those 
changes in historical context to highlight some relevant features of constitu-
tional design as well as some risks posed by post-9/11 reforms. The federalist 
macrostructure of our national security system has changed dramatically during 
the course of our history, and it will continue to evolve.  
 
 16. See Bayley & Weisburd, supra note 14, at 86 (citing dearth of systematic assess-
ments of post-9/11 police departments and activities).  
 17. See generally Richard Briffault, “What About the ‘Ism’?” Normative and Formal 
Concerns in Contemporary Federalism, 47 VAND. L. REV. 1303, 1307-09 (1994) (discussing 
differences between the federal-state relationship and the state-local relationship). 
 18. See Charles R. Wise & Rania Nader, Organizing the Federal System for Homeland 
Security: Problems, Issues, and Dilemmas, 62 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 44, 49 (2002); see also 
NAT’L GOVERNORS ASS’N CTR. FOR BEST PRACTICES, 2007 STATE HOMELAND SECURITY 
DIRECTORS SURVEY 5 (2007), available at http://www.nga.org/files/live/sites/NGA/files/pdf/ 
0712HOMELANDSURVEY.PDF (reporting wide variation among states in the level of 
state-local government coordination on homeland security issues).  
 19. See Peter Eisinger, Imperfect Federalism: The Intergovernmental Partnership for 
Homeland Security, 66 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 537, 541-42 (2006) (explaining that federal-local 
homeland security partnerships are largely run through state governments). 
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Part II analyzes the leading scholarly accounts of how state and local gov-
ernments today form part of the larger national security institutional configura-
tion. Many accounts of the vertical dimension of national security intergovern-
mental relations see legal and policy decisionmaking as top-down, with state 
and local governments largely taking cues from the federal government. A 
counternarrative among some scholars holds, however, that state and local gov-
ernments can and do also push back against federal inclinations—sometimes 
successfully, sometimes not—and that the vertical relationship among national 
security institutions at various levels creates space for diversity of legal and 
policy balances across jurisdictions in ways that may protect liberty. This Part 
argues that those leading accounts, while each having some explanatory value, 
are limited in their capacity to account for emergent intergovernmental rela-
tions and also in the normative criteria by which they assess those relations and 
their specific arrangements. 
To sketch a more complete picture and offer lessons to guide institutional 
development into the future, Part III builds on the leading accounts by analyz-
ing vertical intergovernmental relations regarding national security intelligence 
in some familiar federalism terms, including the ways allocation of government 
responsibility affects accountability and the economics of national security as a 
form of regulation. Examining accountability mechanisms in the national secu-
rity context highlights the risk that state and local participation in federal pro-
grams will undermine the public’s ability to influence government policy at 
those levels. However, this Part suggests ways that any such deficit should be 
offset by improvements in other types of accountability—reasoned decision-
making and compliance oversight—by structuring cooperation to bolster joint 
federal-local policymaking and by creating a mix of centralized and localized 
monitoring. Examination of national security intelligence in terms of regulation 
economics helps distinguish which national security intelligence policies (such 
as information sharing) are probably best dictated at the federal level, because 
uniformity is important or because states and localities might otherwise exter-
nalize too many costs, and which policies (such as information gathering) are 
probably best set or heavily influenced at more local levels, because of the need 
to tailor intelligence policy to local contexts and to learn from processes of in-
novation and adaptation. 
Part III then concludes with examples to illustrate application of the fede-
ralism frames developed throughout this Article to several pressing counterter-
rorism policy questions. Even if one remains convinced by standard narratives 
about intergovernmental relations in the national security domain, the federal-
ism frames presented here and the insights they yield provide a richer account 
of how national security federalism operates, how its operation should be 
judged, and how we should think about improving it—especially as terrorism 
threats continue to evolve. 
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I. NATIONAL SECURITY FEDERALISM BEFORE AND AFTER 9/11 
In modern times it is natural to think of national security as primarily, if 
not exclusively, a centralized federal responsibility. That is, national security is 
seen as a policy waged mostly by the President—as commander-in-chief and 
chief executive—controlling massive federal defense and security departments 
and agencies, which are created, funded, and overseen by Congress and scruti-
nized by federal courts. In that light, the dramatic post-9/11 expansion of sub-
federal roles in combating contemporary national security threats of terrorism 
seems not only like a reversal of pre-9/11 federal centralization of national se-
curity functions, but one that is potentially subversive of constitutional order. It 
is important, however, to understand recent institutional developments within 
an American constitutional structure that distributes governmental security 
powers vertically as well as horizontally. 
A.  National Security Federalism and Domestic Intelligence in Historical 
Context 
Situating post-9/11 national security federalism in historical context reveals 
structural features of the original constitutional design that were intended to 
check or influence the federal national security powers and that are now ree-
merging after lying dormant for a long period. However, it also highlights some 
contemporary risks of local government involvement in national security, not 
only based on past experience but also because local oversight institutions are 
weak or atrophied. Understanding those features and risks is important in Part 
II, which follows, for explaining and assessing post-9/11 institutional realign-
ments, and in Part III, below, for proposing ways to improve them. 
1. Vertical arrangement of national defense powers and the 
centralization of national security 
It is well known that the Founders generally viewed vertical separation or 
shared authority between the federal and state governments, in addition to hori-
zontal separation of authority among federal branches, as a check on govern-
mental power. As James Madison famously explained in The Federalist No. 51: 
“In the compound republic of America, the power surrendered by the people is 
first divided between two distinct governments, and then the portion allotted to 
each subdivided among distinct and separate departments. Hence a double se-
curity arises to the rights of the people.”20 It is less well remembered, however, 
that even as they sought to remedy deficiencies of the Articles of Confederation 
by strengthening central government defense and foreign affairs powers, the 
 
 20. THE FEDERALIST NO. 51, at 323 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961); see 
also THE FEDERALIST NO. 28 (Alexander Hamilton), supra (discussing mutual checks be-
tween federal and state governments).  
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Founders also specifically checked those powers by leaving some responsibili-
ties with the states.21  
The Constitution institutionalized a dual-army system, for example, pre-
serving the historic state militias while providing the new federal government 
with authority to establish a regular army and to provide for the common de-
fense.22 Federalism in the sphere of national defense offered another safeguard 
against security-driven tyranny, especially at a time when major security threats 
had internal components (including rebellions and conflicts with Native Ameri-
cans) or lay just beyond the new republic’s tenuous borders.23  
The modern expansion and consolidation of national security resources and 
institutions at the federal level resulted from two major transformations starting 
in the mid-nineteenth century, both linked to dire national security threats and 
strategic necessity. The first was the Civil War, in which the requirements of 
mass mobilization and industrializing warfare produced a vast federal army and 
attendant centralized administrative structures.24 The United States’s aims in 
the Civil War—to preserve the Union from secessions and, later, to combat sla-
very—also publicly cast strong federal government national security powers as 
a vital check against liberty deprivation by states.25  
 The second transformation was the creation of the major, standing federal 
national security agencies during and after World War II, which followed on 
the footsteps of the ascending modern administrative state.26 That war required 
federal mobilization of national security resources on an unprecedented scale. 
Superpower status and the Cold War then required that the United States retain 
rather than demobilize that massive national security apparatus. The National 
Security Act of 1947 created and consolidated much of the vast federal national 
security bureaucracy that exists today.27 
 
 21. See ABRAHAM D. SOFAER, WAR, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND CONSTITUTIONAL POWER 
21-38 (1976).  
 22. See ALLAN R. MILLET & PETER MASLOWSKI, FOR THE COMMON DEFENSE: A 
MILITARY HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 88 (1984); Jason Mazzone, The Se-
curity Constitution, 53 UCLA L. REV. 29, 39-47 (2005). 
 23. See AKHIL REED AMAR, AMERICA’S CONSTITUTION 116-19 (2005); MILLET & 
MASLOWSKI, supra note 22, at 88-90. 
 24. See RICHARD FRANKLIN BENSEL, YANKEE LEVIATHAN: THE ORIGINS OF CENTRAL 
STATE AUTHORITY IN AMERICA, 1859-1877, at 94-237 (1990). 
 25. See PAUL FOOS, A SHORT, OFFHAND, KILLING AFFAIR: SOLDIERS AND SOCIAL 
CONFLICT DURING THE MEXICAN-AMERICAN WAR 171 (2002) (“The blue [U.S. Army] uni-
form had been a badge of shame for Mexican War volunteers; it quickly became an honora-
ble symbol of national service in the Civil War.”); see also AMAR, supra note 23, at 380. 
 26. Edward Corwin argued that World War II mobilization and post-war national se-
curity imperatives came at the expense of dual federalism. See EDWARD SAMUEL CORWIN, 
TOTAL WAR AND THE CONSTITUTION 70, 173-74 (1947). 
 27. See DOUGLAS T. STUART, CREATING THE NATIONAL SECURITY STATE: A HISTORY 
OF THE LAW THAT TRANSFORMED AMERICA 180-273 (2008). 
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2. Twentieth-century domestic intelligence abuses and oversight 
reform 
The focus of twentieth-century American national security policy was 
overwhelmingly external and abroad, so state and local institutions were natu-
rally not viewed as part of the security apparatus in any serious or sustained 
way. There was, however, an internal component to the threat as well, in the 
form of perceived subversion. The United States government feared that anar-
chists, communists, and other militant radicals with ties to foreign ideological 
movements posed a significant national security threat28—and this internal di-
mension necessitated an expanding domestic intelligence effort.29 
In pursuing domestic intelligence programs, the federal government some-
times (including during some of the most notorious episodes) procured the sup-
port of local police agencies. For example, in the years following World War 
I—a period now remembered for overblown alarm, expansive targeting, and 
disgraceful security measures in response to radical leftist activity—J. Edgar 
Hoover’s Bureau of Investigation (the forerunner of the FBI) enlisted local po-
lice agencies to conduct a series of raids directed by Attorney General A. Mit-
chell Palmer on suspected radicals.30 In the 1950s and 1960s, the FBI requested 
local police agencies’ assistance in its infamous Counter-Intelligence Program 
(COINTELPRO) efforts to monitor allegedly subversive political groups. 
Those Cold War programs included extensive surveillance, disruption, and 
smear campaigns against civil rights organizations and anti-Vietnam War 
groups.31 
Disclosure of such intelligence abuses eventually spurred oversight reform. 
In the mid-1970s, the United States Senate Select Committee to Study Go-
vernmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities, better known as 
the Church Committee, as well as other major investigations, uncovered wide-
spread excesses and illegalities among government intelligence agencies, espe-
cially at the federal level, including within the FBI and CIA.32 Most relevant 
here, these investigations also exposed federal efforts to enlist local police in 
 
 28. See Laura K. Donohue, Anglo-American Privacy and Surveillance, 96 J. CRIM. L. 
& CRIMINOLOGY 1059, 1072-77 (2006). 
 29. See WILLIAM W. KELLER, THE LIBERALS AND J. EDGAR HOOVER 154-89 (1989); 
William C. Banks & M.E. Bowman, Executive Authority for National Security Surveillance, 
50 AM. U. L. REV. 1, 20 (2000). 
 30. See GEOFFREY R. STONE, PERILOUS TIMES: FREE SPEECH IN WARTIME FROM THE 
SEDITION ACT OF 1798 TO THE WAR ON TERRORISM 220-26 (2004). 
 31. For a history of these episodes, see generally RICHARD E. MORGAN, DOMESTIC 
INTELLIGENCE: MONITORING DISSENT IN AMERICA (1980). 
 32. On the House side, Representative Otis Pike chaired a similar committee investiga-
tion. See Loch K. Johnson, Congressional Supervision of America’s Secret Agencies: The 
Experience and Legacy of the Church Committee, 64 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 3, 10 (2004). Presi-
dent Ford also created the Commission on CIA Activities Within the United States. Banks & 
Bowman, supra note 29, at 32.  
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inappropriate or illicit domestic intelligence efforts, including infiltration of po-
litical groups and large-scale compilation of dossiers on citizens and local 
community groups by so-called “red squads,” special intelligence units formed 
to target suspected subversives. As shown below, these past collaborations be-
tween federal intelligence agencies and local police continue to reverberate as 
examples of how domestic intelligence can run amok. 
The Church Committee found, for example, that during the 1964-76 pe-
riod, “[i]n contrast to previous policies for centralizing domestic intelligence 
investigations, the Federal Government encouraged local police to establish in-
telligence programs both for their own use and to feed into the Federal intelli-
gence-gathering process. This greatly expanded the domestic intelligence appa-
ratus, making it harder to control.”33 “These Federal policies,” the Committee 
further concluded, “contributed to the proliferation of local police intelligence 
activities, often without adequate controls. One result was that still more per-
sons were subjected to investigation who neither engaged in unlawful activity, 
nor belonged to groups which might be violent.”34  
Investigation of intelligence abuses also revealed efforts by federal agen-
cies to avoid accountability for activities delegated to local agencies: “Local 
police intelligence provided a convenient manner for the FBI to acquire infor-
mation it wanted while avoiding criticism for using covert techniques such as 
developing campus informants. . . . Instead of recruiting student informants it-
self, the FBI would rely on local police to do so.”35  
At the federal level, intelligence abuse investigations of the 1970s even-
tually produced a constellation of formal oversight mechanisms and checks on 
domestic intelligence activities arrayed across all three branches of govern-
ment.36 Designing oversight mechanisms suited to practices necessarily 
shrouded in high degrees of secrecy was a challenge; public scrutiny would not 
provide a natural check, and meaningfully monitoring intelligence activities re-
quires sophisticated expertise among the overseers that is difficult to acquire.37 
Congress therefore created permanent congressional intelligence oversight 
committees,38 which were expected to develop stronger expertise and deploy it 
with greater vigor than the informal and loose congressional oversight mechan-
 
 33. S. REP. NO. 94-755, bk. 2, at 68 (1976). 
 34. Id. at 78. On the role of the CIA in recruiting local agency partners, see id. at 103. 
 35. Id. at 78. 
 36. See generally RICHARD A. BEST, JR., CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL32500, 
PROPOSALS FOR INTELLIGENCE REORGANIZATION, 1949-2004, at 19-26 (2004) (discussing the 
work and recommendations of the Rockefeller Commission, Church Committee, and Pike 
Committee). 
 37. See FREDERICK M. KAISER, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL32525, CONGRESSIONAL 
OVERSIGHT OF INTELLIGENCE: CURRENT STRUCTURE AND ALTERNATIVES 27-29 (2008); Loch 
K. Johnson, Ostriches, Cheerleaders, Skeptics, and Guardians: Role Selection by Congres-
sional Intelligence Overseers, 28 SAIS REV. 93, 104-06 (2008).  
 38. See Frederick M. Kaiser, A Proposed Joint Committee on Intelligence: New Wine 
in an Old Bottle, 5 J.L. & POL. 127, 130-38 (1988). 
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isms that preceded them.39 A few years later, Congress passed the Foreign In-
telligence Surveillance Act (FISA), which regulated foreign intelligence sur-
veillance inside the United States or by U.S. persons and created the Foreign 
Intelligence Surveillance Court (FISC) to oversee special warrants for that pur-
pose.40 Internal executive branch reforms included executive orders limiting 
some intelligence activities, Justice Department guidelines on national security-
related investigations,41 new institutions like inspectors general for national se-
curity agencies,42 and executive branch oversight boards to monitor intelli-
gence activities and their compliance with federal law and policy.43 Debate 
continues to rage over whether those oversight mechanisms are sufficiently ro-
bust,44 but the point here is that together these layers of oversight constrained 
continuing federal domestic intelligence efforts from multiple directions and 
helped distribute intelligence expertise beyond the agencies or subagencies 
conducting it. 
In contrast to reforms at the federal level following the intelligence abuses 
of the 1970s, many state and local agencies dismantled their national security 
intelligence apparatuses altogether or adopted tight restrictions—including 
judicial consent decrees—on their ability to function at all.45 “In some cities 
and towns the [political intelligence] operation was simply ended without for-
mal action. In larger cities restrictive guidelines were adopted to avoid more 
drastic, embarrassing, and expensive measures.”46 Chicago’s “red squad” oper-
ations, which had especially tight links with federal national security agencies 
 
 39. See Johnson, supra note 32, at 5-12. 
 40. See Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-511, §§ 102-
103, 92 Stat. 1783, 1786-1788 (to be codified as amended at 50 U.S.C. §§ 1802-1803); 
GREGORY F. TREVERTON, REORGANIZING U.S. DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE: ASSESSING THE 
OPTIONS 8 (2008) (discussing FISA and the “wall” between intelligence and law enforce-
ment).  
 41. See Banks & Bowman, supra note 29, at 35, 68-70.  
 42. See Paul C. Light, Federal Inspectors General and the Paths to Accountability, in 
HANDBOOK OF ADMINISTRATIVE ETHICS 387, 388-92 (Terry L. Cooper ed., 2d ed. 2000).  
 43. These executive oversight mechanisms included the Intelligence Oversight Board 
created by President Ford in Executive Order No. 11,905, 3 C.F.R. 90 (1976), reprinting 41 
Fed. Reg. 7703 (Feb. 19, 1976).  
 44. See, e.g., Frederick M. Kaiser, Congressional Oversight of the Presidency, 499 
ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 75 (1988). This debate has also continued regarding 
post-9/11 oversight. See, e.g., AMY B. ZEGART, EYES ON SPIES: CONGRESS AND THE UNITED 
STATES INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY 1-11 (2011); Christopher M. Ford, Intelligence Demands 
in a Democratic State: Congressional Intelligence Oversight, 81 TUL. L. REV. 721 (2007).  
 45. See BUREAU OF JUSTICE ASSISTANCE, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, INTELLIGENCE-LED 
POLICING: THE NEW INTELLIGENCE ARCHITECTURE 5 (2005); Edward R. Maguire & William 
R. King, Trends in the Policing Industry, 593 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 15, 19 
(2004); Samuel J. Rascoff, Domesticating Intelligence, 83 S. CAL. L. REV. 575, 593-94 
(2010). See generally Chevigny, supra note 9 (discussing litigation related to local intelli-
gence abuses and resulting reforms). 
 46. FRANK DONNER, PROTECTORS OF PRIVILEGE: RED SQUADS AND POLICE REPRESSION 
IN URBAN AMERICA 346 (1990). 
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and involved extensive surveillance and intimidation campaigns against politi-
cal organizations, were curtailed as a result of federal litigation and a settlement 
that severely restricted intelligence activities.47 To deal with abuses such as po-
lice infiltration and monitoring of civil rights organizations in Baltimore, the 
Maryland state government restricted information collection by agencies and 
granted wide public access to file data.48 The Detroit city government, whose 
police intelligence units had spied on student and antiwar groups as well as in-
dividual political activists, dismantled its “red squads” and prohibited investi-
gations of persons or organizations except when sufficiently linked to suspected 
criminal violations.49 
Because the federal government still served as the ultimate national securi-
ty backstop, states and cities could afford to pull back from national security 
intelligence activities in ways that the federal government could not. From the 
1970s until 2001, intelligence oversight reform at the federal level generally 
proceeded in parallel with intelligence atrophy at the local level. As explained 
later in Part III, these divergent historical paths of reform have important impli-
cations for designing effective oversight architecture going forward. 
B.  Post-9/11 National Security and Domestic Intelligence 
Following the September 11, 2001 attacks, the federal government under-
went structural realignment and expanded resources and legal authorities di-
rected toward domestic intelligence.50 The USA PATRIOT Act brought down 
the “wall” that had previously stood between federal law enforcement and in-
telligence.51 The FBI shifted its priorities and allocation of personnel toward 
intelligence and terrorism prevention,52 and it expanded its guidelines for in-
itiating inquiries and conducting investigations.53 The new Department of Ho-
meland Security, which Congress created in 2003, has an Office of Intelligence 
and Analysis responsible for collection, analysis, and dissemination of domes-
 
 47. See id. at 90-145, 353. 
 48. See id. at 300-05. 
 49. See id. at 296-98.  
 50. See Chitra Ragavan, Who Ya Gonna Call?, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., May 20, 
2002, at 14 (describing the retooling of the FBI to combat terrorism after 9/11). 
 51. See William C. Banks, And the Wall Came Tumbling Down: Secret Surveillance 
After the Terror, 57 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1147, 1148 (2003). 
 52. See Departments of Commerce, Justice, and State, the Judiciary, and Related 
Agencies Appropriations for 2004: Hearing Before a Subcomm. of the H. Comm. on Appro-
priations, 108th Cong. 10-17 (2003) (statement of Robert Mueller, Director, FBI), available 
at http://www.fbi.gov/news/testimony/progress-report-on-the-reorganization-and-refocus-of 
-the-fbi. 
 53. See Charlie Savage, F.B.I. Casts Wide Net Under Relaxed Rules for Terror Inqui-
ries, Data Show, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 27, 2011, at A19. 
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tic security threat information.54 The President directed the National Security 
Agency to conduct expanded electronic surveillance of individuals or commu-
nications inside the United States, first pursuant to his asserted executive pow-
ers55 and then pursuant to amendments to the 1978 Foreign Intelligence Sur-
veillance Act.56 And the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 
2004 created the Office of the Director of National Intelligence and the Nation-
al Counterterrorism Center to coordinate intelligence activities among govern-
ment agencies.57  
The September 2001 terrorist attacks briefly produced calls among some 
lawmakers and experts for the United States to centralize domestic intelligence 
much further by creating a new agency dedicated solely to that function,58 per-
haps modeled on the United Kingdom’s MI-5.59 Such proposals were quickly 
shelved, however, in part due to likely political backlash over civil liberty con-
cerns.60 The 9/11 Commission rejected the idea of creating a large stand-alone 
domestic intelligence agency, proposing instead measures and coordination bo-
dies to improve capabilities within and among existing agencies.61 
This post-9/11 emphasis on intelligence coordination included a significant 
role for state and local governments, where so much intelligence capacity re-
sides. “To meet this new threat and to prevent future attacks,” Attorney General 
John Ashcroft wrote to all U.S. Attorneys in November 2001, “law enforce-
ment officials at all levels of government—federal, state, and local—must work 
together, sharing information and resources needed both to arrest and prosecute 
the individuals responsible and to detect and destroy terrorist cells before they 
can strike again.”62 The 9/11 Commission concluded that state and local law 
enforcement agencies needed more intelligence training and needed to work 
 
 54. See About the Office of Intelligence and Analysis, DEP’T HOMELAND SECURITY, 
http://www.dhs.gov/xabout/structure/gc_1220886590914.shtm (last modified Aug. 26, 
2011). 
 55. See Eric Lichtblau & James Risen, Top Aide Defends Domestic Spying, N.Y. 
TIMES, Feb. 7, 2006, at A1. 
 56. See Eric Lichtblau et al., Reported Drop in Surveillance Spurred a Law, N.Y. 
TIMES, Aug. 11, 2007, at A1. 
 57. See 50 U.S.C. §§ 403, 404(o) (2006). 
 58. See, e.g., RICHARD C. SHELBY, SEPTEMBER 11 AND THE IMPERATIVE OF REFORM IN 
THE U.S. INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY 75-76 (2002), available at http://intelligence.senate 
.gov/shelby.pdf; William E. Odom, Editorial, Why the FBI Can’t Be Reformed, WASH. POST, 
June 29, 2005, at A21. 
 59. See Who We Are, MI-5, https://www.mi5.gov.uk/output/who-we-are.html (last vi-
sited Feb. 16, 2012).  
 60. See Louie Freeh, Letter to the Editor, Former FBI Director Says U.S. Doesn’t 
Need a National Police Force, WALL ST. J., Mar. 31, 2007, at A9; Ronald Kessler, Editorial, 
No to an American MI5, WASH. POST, Jan. 5, 2003, at B7. 
 61. NAT’L COMM’N ON TERRORIST ATTACKS UPON THE U.S., THE 9/11 COMMISSION 
REPORT 423 (2004) [hereinafter 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT]. 
 62. Memorandum from Attorney Gen. John Ashcroft to All U.S. Attorneys (Nov. 13, 
2001), available at http://www.fas.org/irp/agency/doj/agdirective5.pdf. 
WAXMAN 64 STAN. L. REV. 289 (DO NOT DELETE) 2/16/2012 3:54 PM 
February 2012] NATIONAL SECURITY FEDERALISM 303 
more closely with federal authorities in identifying terrorism suspects.63 Many 
of the informational “dots” comprising the 9/11 plot sequence had been de-
tected by someone, somewhere, at some level of government in the United 
States; others should have been seen and passed on but were missed. Perhaps, 
the argument ran, the attacks could have been averted with better systems and 
policies to discern, analyze, assemble, and act on such “dots” throughout the 
country, ultimately uncovering patterns and the plot.64 
The post-9/11 policy emphasis on integrating local security and law en-
forcement agencies within the national security architecture was heightened by 
the perception that future terrorism threats might already lie within U.S. bor-
ders, so-called sleeper cells waiting to strike.65 Terrorism was by no means an 
entirely new problem for the United States in 2001, nor were state and local 
governments uninvolved in the counterterrorism effort before then.66 A broad 
survey, however, found that “terrorism prevention never appeared to be a high 
priority for state and local law enforcement agencies before Sept. 11.”67 After 
9/11, consensus emerged across levels of government that preventing and in-
vestigating terrorism threats would require mobilizing and linking local gov-
ernments.68 
 
 63. 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 61, at 390; see also id. at 401 (“A ‘smart’ 
government would integrate all sources of information to see the enemy as a whole.”). 
 64. See id. at 215-41, 416-18. The influential Markle Foundation Task Force on Na-
tional Security in the Information Age likewise concluded that a new nationwide intelligence 
architecture was needed to link information horizontally among agencies and vertically 
among levels of government. See MARKLE FOUND. TASK FORCE ON NAT’L SEC. IN THE INFO. 
AGE, PROTECTING AMERICA’S FREEDOM IN THE INFORMATION AGE 48 (2002). 
 65. See generally DINA TEMPLE-RASTON, THE JIHAD NEXT DOOR: THE LACKAWANNA 
SIX AND ROUGH JUSTICE IN THE AGE OF TERROR (2007) (describing the post-9/11 concern 
with sleeper cells inside the United States). 
 66. The 1990s alone saw the 1993 World Trade Center bombing, the Oklahoma City 
bombing, and the series of attacks by “Unabomber” Theodore Kaczynski. See Banks & 
Bowman, supra note 29, at 97-106. 
 67. COUNCIL OF STATE GOV’TS & E. KY. UNIV., THE IMPACT OF TERRORISM ON STATE 
LAW ENFORCEMENT: ADJUSTING TO NEW ROLES AND CHANGING CONDITIONS 9 (2006). One 
major survey in the mid-1990s found that only about thirty-eight percent of state and local 
governments had contingency plans for dealing with terrorist threats; another forty percent 
reported never having had contact with federal agencies regarding terrorism issues. See 
KEVIN JACK RILEY & BRUCE HOFFMAN, DOMESTIC TERRORISM: A NATIONAL ASSESSMENT OF 
STATE AND LOCAL PREPAREDNESS 26, 31 (1995). 
 68. See COUNCIL OF STATE GOV’TS & E. KY. UNIV., supra note 67, at 24 (citing survey 
results that ninety-two percent of state law enforcement agencies reported allocating more or 
many more resources for intelligence gathering, analysis, and sharing since September 
2001). For views from the local government level, see, for example, INT’L ASS’N OF CHIEFS 
OF POLICE, INTELLIGENCE-LED POLICING: THE NEW INTELLIGENCE ARCHITECTURE 23 (2005). 
But see RILEY ET AL., supra note 11, at 27 (discussing survey findings suggesting that coun-
terterrorism intelligence is not as pervasive a function among local law enforcement agencies 
as some believe); Cynthia Lum et al., Police Activities to Counter Terrorism: What We 
Know and What We Need to Know, in TO PROTECT AND TO SERVE: POLICING IN AN AGE OF 
TERRORISM, supra note 14, at 101, 115 (citing survey showing that very few police forces 
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Integration of local agencies into national security intelligence functions 
after 9/11 was driven not only by this imperative for tighter coordination 
among government components and levels, but also the widespread view that 
local agencies had some unique intelligence capabilities to offer.69 Local police 
are often believed to be better suited to perform certain counterterrorism func-
tions because of their superior familiarity with their local communities and 
their rich networks of relations with other local governmental and nongovern-
mental actors.70 Whereas federal law enforcement officials are tasked with in-
vestigating specific federal crimes, local police functions include preventing 
and investigating crime as well as maintaining order, patrolling, and providing 
services—and these are not always distinct from national security functions in 
the counterterrorism context. Modern policing strategy trends also call for wide 
and deep engagement within the community.71 It is often argued, then, that be-
cause local police are armed with this familiarity and these sets of community 
and institutional relationships, they are naturally positioned to detect and ana-
lyze suspicious irregularities and to cultivate sources of information—thus con-
tributing to national security, often just in the course of their everyday           
activities.72 
Efforts to harness local governments into national security functions, par-
ticularly into intelligence related to terrorism threats, have not abated over the 
past decade.73 The Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act, as 
amended in 2007 by the 9/11 Commission Act, specifically requires the Presi-
 
have specialized intelligence analysts or intelligence units dedicated to terrorism, and that 
these features are virtually nonexistent in small agencies). 
 69. See NAT’L CRIMINAL JUSTICE ASS’N, SERVING AND PROTECTING IN THE SHADOW OF 
TERRORISM 2 (2003). 
 70. See RILEY ET AL., supra note 11, at 1. 
 71. The term has many different meanings, but generally “community policing” is “a 
partnership philosophy that increases collaboration (or at least consultation) between the 
community and the police, decentralises police organisational hierarchy, gives greater discre-
tion to lower ranks, places greater influence in the hands of the community in determining 
police priorities, and promotes a social service ethos.” JERRY RATCLIFFE, INTELLIGENCE-LED 
POLICING 3 (2008).  
 72. See Badi Hasisi et al., The Impacts of Policing Terrorism on Society: Lessons from 
Israel and the US, in TO PROTECT AND TO SERVE: POLICING IN AN AGE OF TERRORISM, supra 
note 14, at 177, 181-87. As discussed later in this Article, however, there is a danger that 
perceptions of police spying and biases against minority communities could erode police-
community trust and therefore render police involvement in counterterrorism intelligence 
counterproductive. See FAIZA PATEL, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUSTICE, RETHINKING 
RADICALIZATION 23-25 (2011). See generally Tom R. Tyler et al., Legitimacy and Deter-
rence Effects in Counterterrorism Policing: A Study of Muslim Americans, 44 LAW & SOC’Y 
REV. 365 (2010) (arguing, based on empirical studies, that perceptions of procedural fairness 
promotes communities’ cooperation with police). 
 73. See DHS: The Path Forward: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Homeland Sec., 
111th Cong. 6-10 (2009) (testimony of Janet Napolitano, Secretary of the Department of 
Homeland Security); see also Dana Priest & William M. Arkin, Monitoring America, WASH. 
POST, Dec. 20, 2010, at A1 (describing growth of state and local intelligence capabilities). 
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dent to take action to facilitate sharing of terrorism-related information among 
federal, state, and local entities.74 In 2008 the Office of the Director of National 
Intelligence published its information-sharing strategy, declaring “the impera-
tive need of moving beyond considering State and local government to be only 
‘first responders,’ preferring instead to thinking [sic] of them as the first line of 
defense in a very deep line of information assets.”75 
Indeed, as elaborated further below, recent incidents of domestic (often 
called “homegrown”) terrorism or the involvement of U.S. persons with foreign 
terrorist organizations abroad has heightened attention to local intelligence and 
counterterrorism efforts.76 In the past few years, for example, federal agencies 
working with local partners arrested and charged Najibullah Zazi, an Afghan 
immigrant who allegedly trained in an al Qaeda camp in Pakistan and planned 
to detonate bombs within the United States,77 and Faisal Shahzad, who alleged-
ly trained with the Pakistani Taliban and tried to detonate a bomb in Times 
Square.78 
Once a major component of the national security threat was seen as resid-
ing or operating within U.S. borders, local police agencies were an obvious re-
source for the federal government to turn to given the vastness of the intelli-
gence challenge. Despite the expansion and creation of new federal 
bureaucracies, much of the country’s domestic security and intelligence capaci-
ty resides below the federal level. 
C. National Security and Local Police After 9/11 
Unlike democracies such as Israel with national police forces,79 or Britain 
and Germany with regional police forces but high degrees of uniformity among 
just a few dozen such agencies,80 the United States has a system of policing—
 
 74. Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004, 6 U.S.C. § 485 (2006 
& Supp. IV 2010). 
 75. OFFICE OF THE DIR. OF NAT’L INTELLIGENCE, UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE 
COMMUNITY INFORMATION SHARING STRATEGY 18 (2008). 
 76. See PETER NEUMANN, NAT’L SEC. PREPAREDNESS GRP., BIPARTISAN POLICY CTR., 
PREVENTING VIOLENT RADICALIZATION IN AMERICA 12, 17, 33-34 (2011); Pierre Thomas et 
al., Holder: Homegrown Terror Threat Increasing, ABC NEWS (July 29, 2009), http://     
abcnews.go.com/Politics/story?id=8202511&singlePage=true. 
 77. See David Johnston & Scott Shane, Terror Case: “Scary” Ingredients, N.Y. 
TIMES, Sept. 25, 2009, at A1. 
 78. See William K. Rashbaum & Al Baker, Smoking Car to an Arrest in 53 Hours, 
N.Y. TIMES, May 5, 2010, at A1. 
 79. See Jack R. Greene & Sergio Herzog, The Implications of Terrorism on the For-
mal and Social Organization of Policing in the US and Israel: Some Concerns and Oppor-
tunities, in TO PROTECT AND TO SERVE: POLICING IN AN AGE OF TERRORISM, supra note 14, at 
143, 150. 
 80. See Bayley & Weisburd, supra note 14, at 86 (describing the British organizational 
structure); Jacqueline E. Ross, The Place of Covert Surveillance in Democratic Societies: A 
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along with its domestic intelligence resources—that is highly localized and he-
terogeneous. Police scholars generally regard the U.S. system as the most 
fragmented in the industrialized world,81 and historically the U.S. system of lo-
calized policing has been very resistant to any calls for centralization or consol-
idation.82 The new national security intelligence architecture has been built on 
this landscape. 
1.  The context 
Numbers and counting methods vary, but most sources estimate that there 
are about 17,000 state and local law enforcement agencies throughout the Unit-
ed States,83 comprised of about 700,000 officers.84 The FBI (the federal agency 
charged with lead responsibility for domestic counterterrorism intelligence) by 
contrast has about 12,000 agents, though its responsibilities are more narrowly 
focused.85 
Policing in the United States is notable for its local variation along many 
dimensions. Police jurisdictions differ greatly in features such as population 
size and density, ethnic composition, geography, urbanization, location of high-
profile targets, civic culture, and political orientation.86 Forces vary in terms of 
size, resources, capability, operating procedures, equipment, and day-to-day 
priorities, not to mention variations in local laws, including those regulating po-
lice conduct.87 In terms of size, for example, the forty-six largest metropolitan 
 
Comparative Study of the United States and Germany, 55 AM. J. COMP. L. 493, 496, 503 
(2007) (describing the German organizational structure). 
 81. See Stephen D. Mastrofski & James J. Willis, Police Organization Continuity and 
Change: Into the Twenty-First Century, 39 CRIME & JUST. 55, 58 (2010). On the U.S. system 
of localized policing in comparison with other democracies, see generally DAVID H. BAYLEY, 
PATTERNS OF POLICING: A COMPARATIVE INTERNATIONAL ANALYSIS (1985). 
 82. See JOHN D. BREWER ET AL., THE POLICE, PUBLIC ORDER AND THE STATE 115 (2d 
ed. 1996); NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, FAIRNESS AND EFFECTIVENESS IN POLICING: THE 
EVIDENCE 51 (Wesley Skogan & Kathleen Frydl eds., 2004). 
 83. See RANDOL, supra note 3, at 3. The Department of Justice provided the following 
numbers for 2004: 12,766 local police departments, 3067 sheriffs’ offices, 1481 special ju-
risdiction agencies, 49 state law enforcement agencies, and 513 other agencies. BRIAN A. 
REAVES, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, CENSUS OF STATE AND LOCAL LAW ENFORCEMENT 
AGENCIES, 2004, at 1 (Carolyn C. Williams ed., 2007), available at http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/ 
content/pub/pdf/csllea04.pdf. 
 84. See REAVES, supra note 83, at 2 (citing more than 17,000 state and local law en-
forcement agencies with more than 700,000 full-time sworn officers); David Thacher, The 
Local Role in Homeland Security, 39 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 635, 635 (2005). 
 85. See Bayley & Weisburd, supra note 14, at 91. 
 86. For a description of contrasting approaches to counterterrorism policing in New 
York City and Los Angeles, see Judith Miller, On the Front Line in the War on Terrorism, 
CITY J., Summer 2007, at 28. 
 87. See Shane Harris, Fusion Centers Raise a Fuss, NAT’L J. (Jan. 31, 2011, 12:44 
PM), http://www.nationaljournal.com/member/magazine/issues-ideas-fusion-centers-raise-a 
-fuss-20070210. 
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police forces account for over a third of all police officers nationwide, while 
there are also nearly eight hundred local police agencies that have just a single 
sworn officer.88 
Consider also the unique threats faced by New York City, which has the 
largest dedicated counterterrorism police force at the municipal level, as a 
densely populated, ethnically diverse home to much of the U.S. and global pri-
vate financial system.89 Some of its features contrast significantly even with 
other major cities, like Los Angeles, which not only differs in size, ethnic com-
position, and resources, but also in its local political system and civic cultural 
orientation especially suspicious of police.90 
In short, harnessing local law enforcement agencies for national security 
means not simply linking and coordinating among a vast number of units but 
also among vastly different capabilities and local community-government rela-
tionships. 
2. Federal efforts to promote local national security activities 
Recognizing the post-9/11 need for better collection and coordination of in-
formation among government entities at all levels, the federal government 
promoted a multitude of initiatives aimed at bolstering state and local intelli-
gence efforts and linking them with federal ones. These included intelligence 
initiatives focused on collection, analysis, and sharing of information related to 
terrorism and national security. 
With regard to information collection, the federal government provides re-
sources and training to state and local police forces to help them establish intel-
ligence units, build databases, and develop standards for intelligence gather-
ing.91 Most states and many local law enforcement agencies have expanded 
intelligence programs since 9/11, including by adding specialized training in 
terrorism prevention. In some cases, they have developed dedicated counterter-
rorism units or capabilities,92 all of which are then governed by a complex pat-
chwork of federal, state, and local laws and guidelines.93 
 
 88. NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 82, at 49. 
 89. See Homeland Security: The Next 5 Years: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Ho-
meland Sec. & Governmental Affairs, 109th Cong. 74-76 (2006) [hereinafter The Next 5 
Years] (statement of Richard A. Falkenrath, Deputy Comm’r for Counterterrorism, New 
York City Police Department). 
 90. See Miller, supra note 86, at 35. 
 91. See Kaplan, supra note 9, at 42-49. For criticism of counterterrorism training pro-
grams at the local level, especially concerning anti-Muslim stereotyping, see NEUMANN, su-
pra note 76, at 44; Shaun Waterman, Anti-Terrorism Training Draws Scrutiny, WASH. 
TIMES, Mar. 30, 2011, at A4. 
 92. See COUNCIL OF STATE GOV’TS & E. KY. UNIV., supra note 67, at 24. 
 93. For some examples, see supra notes 9-13 and accompanying text. 
WAXMAN 64 STAN. L. REV. 289 (DO NOT DELETE) 2/16/2012 3:54 PM 
308 STANFORD LAW REVIEW [Vol. 64:289 
Much of the federal-local collaborative intelligence gathering on terrorism 
threats occurs through FBI-led Joint Terrorism Task Forces,94 to which other 
federal, state, and local agencies assign officers to help coordinate intelligence 
and law enforcement operations across bureaucratic lines. Such efforts resem-
ble previous federal efforts to confront other law enforcement issues, like nar-
cotics trafficking and gang or organized crime activity, that have national and 
international dimensions and that require coordination among federal and local 
police agencies.95 In essence, those state and local personnel work day-to-day 
on behalf of the federal government. There were about three dozen such task 
forces before September 2001, compared with more than 100 today.96 
With regard to information analysis, the federal government has worked 
with state and local governments to develop systems for synthesizing informa-
tion collected within and across jurisdictions. For example, the Department of 
Homeland Security funds state-operated “fusion centers” to compile, analyze, 
and route electronically stored law enforcement and investigative information, 
including public as well as private sector data.97 The federal government pro-
vides grants and intelligence personnel to these centers, which now number 
more than seventy,98 and the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007 called for ex-
panded federal efforts to “support efforts to include State, local, and regional 
fusion centers into efforts to establish an information sharing environment.”99 
Some programs to bring state and local government into the intelligence analy-
sis process are motivated not only by a desire to produce and share more infor-
mation, but also because expanded information collection efforts can create a 
problem of overload or too many “dots,” and state and local analytical 
 
 94. See Protecting America Against Terrorist Attack: Our Joint Terrorism Task 
Forces, FBI, http://www.fbi.gov/about-us/investigate/terrorism/terrorism_jttfs (last visited 
Feb. 16, 2012). 
 95. See Kip Schlegel, Transnational Crime: Implications for Local Law Enforcement, 
16 J. CONTEMP. CRIM. JUST. 365 (2000). For example, the FBI manages Violent Gang Task 
Forces and the Drug Enforcement Agency manages Organized Crime Drug Enforcement 
Task Forces. See, e.g., Organized Crime Drug Enforcement Task Forces (OCDETF), DRUG 
ENFORCEMENT AGENCY, http://www.usdoj.gov/dea/programs/ocdetf.htm (last visited Feb. 
16, 2012); Violent Gang Task Forces, FBI, http://www.fbi.gov/about-us/investigate/vc 
_majorthefts/gangs/violent-gangs-task-forces (last visited Feb. 16, 2012). 
 96. Protecting America: National Task Force Wages War on Terror, FBI (Aug. 19, 
2008), http://www.fbi.gov/news/stories/2008/august/njttf_081908. 
 97. See JOHN ROLLINS, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL34070, FUSION CENTERS: ISSUES 
AND OPTIONS FOR CONGRESS 1 (2008); U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-08-35, 
FEDERAL EFFORTS ARE HELPING TO ALLEVIATE SOME CHALLENGES ENCOUNTERED BY STATE 
AND LOCAL INFORMATION FUSION CENTERS 2, 23 (2007); O’Harrow, supra note 7.  
 98. See RANDOL, supra note 3, at 2. 
 99. Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007, 6 U.S.C. 
§ 124(h) (Supp. I 2007). 
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processes can help sift through and improve the quality of data like tips and re-
ports of suspicious activities coming into the system.100 
As to information sharing, key issues include ensuring that disparate but re-
lated bits of information get pieced together and that intelligence products are 
delivered to those who need to act. Data are therefore increasingly exchanged 
via initiatives among federal, state, and local law enforcement agencies. In ad-
dition to fusion centers, these data-sharing initiatives include classified net-
works that circulate information between federal agencies and state fusion cen-
ters.101 Fusion centers select and analyze information, sending it up to federal 
agencies that then produce classified intelligence by a series of processes, in-
cluding pattern analysis and data mining.102 Other networks transmit sensitive 
but unclassified information to and among federal, state, and local agencies.103 
As mentioned earlier, state laws on information collection and sharing vary,104 
reflecting local policy preferences. 
 
*   *   * 
 
It is tempting to think of national security policy as inherently national un-
der our constitutional scheme.105 The federal government’s primacy in foreign 
affairs is often defended as instrumentally necessary for effective diplomacy,106 
yet it also rests on understandings of national sovereignty and inherent centra-
lized powers in the federal government as aspects of that sovereignty.107 After 
9/11, the rhetoric—as well as the law—of a “war” against terrorism also cast 
counterterrorism naturally as a federal responsibility.108 Meanwhile, basic law 
and order and criminal justice remain stridently protected as a local domain.109 
 
100. See RANDOL, supra note 3, at 15-16; Ken Dilanian, Security at What Price?, L.A. 
TIMES, Nov. 15, 2010, at A8. 
101. See RANDOL, supra note 3, at 2, 20. 
102. See id. at 2.  
103. See id. at 20. 
104. See supra notes 11-12 and accompanying text. 
105. Cf. Richard J. Riordan & Amy B. Zegart, City Hall Goes to War, N.Y. TIMES, July 
5, 2002, at A19 (“Americans have always looked to the federal government for protection 
from enemies abroad.”). 
106. See Am. Ins. Ass’n v. Garamendi, 539 U.S. 396, 413 (2003). 
107. See United States v. Belmont, 301 U.S. 324, 330-31 (1937); United States v. Cur-
tiss-Wright Exp. Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 317-18 (1936). 
108. Cf. Press Release, The White House, President Bush Releases National Strategy 
for Combating Terrorism (Feb. 14, 2003), available at http://georgewbush-whitehouse 
.archives.gov/news/releases/2003/02/20030214-7.html. 
109. As the Supreme Court wrote in United States v. Morrison: “[W]e can think of no 
better example of the police power, which the Founders denied the National Government and 
reposed in the States, than the suppression of violent crime and vindication of its victims.” 
529 U.S. 598, 618 (2000). 
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As is probably clear by now, however, contemporary terrorism challenges 
have attributes of a police and law enforcement problem as well as attributes of 
a national defense and foreign affairs problem. They do not fall neatly into    
either of these familiar categories. Moreover, the brief historical account pre-
sented above reveals that national security and defense have never been such 
exclusive federal spheres as one might easily suppose.110 Is contemporary ter-
rorism a national and international problem with some local dimensions to it, or 
is it a local problem that has national and international implications? As a mat-
ter of basic constitutional allocation of responsibility, where does national secu-
rity intelligence—especially counterterrorism work—fit?111 
Post-9/11 institutional innovations related to information collection, analy-
sis, and sharing have pushed some national security intelligence responsibilities 
down to state and local levels, though this intelligence architecture is very 
much a work in progress and continues to evolve. Although the federal gov-
ernment wields vast influence with law, politics, and resources, state and local 
governments have reemerged as significant players in the national security   
arena. 
II. VERTICAL RELATIONS AND NATIONAL SECURITY POWERS: LEADING 
ACCOUNTS AND THEIR LIMITS 
What happens to state and local law and policy when it is coordinated or 
overlaid with federal initiatives to expand governmental national security pow-
ers? How should we understand and evaluate the vertical relationships among 
the levels of government in the national security arena? This Part explores the 
leading answers to those questions in contemporary counterterrorism law de-
bates, and the limits of those answers. 
One set of leading narratives of vertical national security relationships is 
what I call “top-down.” In describing state and local actions mostly in familiar 
terms of liberty versus security, it views major rebalancing as struck at the top, 
at the federal level, with state and local governments following that lead. A 
 
110. The Supreme Court considered and rejected a version of this exclusive sphere ar-
gument in the case Gilbert v. Minnesota, 254 U.S. 325 (1920), better known as a free speech 
case. Minnesota had passed a statute during World War I making it unlawful to interfere 
with or discourage military enlistment. Id. at 326. In challenging it, a criminal defendant ar-
gued that “Congress alone can under the Constitution ‘provide for the common defence.’” 
Id. at 328 (quoting U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1). Rejecting this claim that any individual 
state has no interest or power in protecting the United States from its enemies, the Supreme 
Court explained that “this country is one composed of many . . . [and] the constituted and 
constituting sovereignties must have power of coöperation against the enemies of all.” Id. at 
329. 
111. Cf. Judith Resnik et al., Ratifying Kyoto at the Local Level: Sovereigntism, Fede-
ralism, and Translocal Organizations of Government Actors (TOGAs), 50 ARIZ. L. REV. 709, 
715-17 (2008) (discussing challenges of categorizing issues as essentially foreign or domes-
tic). 
WAXMAN 64 STAN. L. REV. 289 (DO NOT DELETE) 2/16/2012 3:54 PM 
February 2012] NATIONAL SECURITY FEDERALISM 311 
second set—“pushback accounts”—emphasizes the way in which state and lo-
cal governments sometimes resist federal efforts. It posits a bottom-up role for 
state and local governments in shaping national security policy, again usually 
emphasizing liberty-security balances as the key metric. Although both sets of 
accounts help explain some important post-9/11 phenomena, neither adequately 
captures the complexities of the emergent domestic intelligence architecture 
and of some of the most pressing or salient policy questions going forward. 
A.  Top-Down Accounts 
Proponents of federal efforts to promote state and local national security 
intelligence activities generally see the programs discussed in Part I as a way of 
promoting sound security policies and sound privacy protections downward. To 
many observers and scholars, however, these efforts are dangerous because ag-
gressive security policies and legal rebalancing at the federal level distort local 
policy functions and legal balances in ways that corrode liberty down through 
the state and local level.112 
1. Hierarchical or principal-agent accounts 
One common set of accounts holds that the vertical coordination of nation-
al security and law enforcement institutions effectively puts local governmental 
powers in the hands of the federal government—that state and local institutions 
and officials essentially become agents of the federal government. This “hierar-
chical” or “principal-agent” view of federal-local coordination sees the federal 
government as controlling local entities and their national security-related re-
sources, and therefore sees local actions as often reflecting legal and policy 
balances set at the federal level.113 
This vision of top-down control generally assumes a functional, not a for-
mal, agency relationship, because constitutionally the federal government may 
not “commandeer” state and local legislators or executive officials.114 In Printz 
v. United States,115 the Supreme Court held unconstitutional the Brady Hand-
gun Violence Prevention Act’s provision requiring that local law enforcement 
officers conduct background checks.116 Writing for the Court, Justice Scalia 
explained: “The Federal Government may neither issue directives requiring the 
States to address particular problems, nor command the States’ officers, or 
 
112. For a discussion of both views, see Harris, supra note 87. 
113. See, e.g., David A. Harris, A Lack of Respect, BOS. REV., Dec. 2004-Jan. 2005, at 
12 (discussing imposition of federal counterterrorism policies on local law enforcement 
agencies). 
114. See Matthew D. Adler, State Sovereignty and the Anti-Commandeering Cases, 574 
ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 158, 163-65 (2001). 
115. 521 U.S. 898 (1997). 
116. Id. at 933. 
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those of their political subdivisions, to administer or enforce a federal regulato-
ry program. . . . [S]uch commands are fundamentally incompatible with our 
constitutional system of dual sovereignty.”117 
Whether because of Printz or other concerns, the federal government uses 
other tools to exert heavy influence over state and local police and other agen-
cies and to induce alignment of their activities with federal initiatives.118 Some 
of these tools were described earlier, including information-sharing arrange-
ments, financial grants, and training programs designed to help bolster and uni-
fy local capabilities.119 
Sometimes federal control of local government intelligence resources can 
be quite strong and direct, as in the Joint Terrorism Task Forces, to which state 
and local governments voluntarily provide resources and personnel under the 
operational control of the FBI. In many cases, the federal government controls 
state and local entities by conditioning its grants and funding on federal guide-
lines, such as information-sharing protocols to promote uniformity as well as 
privacy standards.120 And in other cases, the federal government may request 
specific local assistance in carrying out federal initiatives. For example, as dis-
cussed in greater detail below, the Justice Department requested in November 
2001 that local police departments assist in locating and interviewing several 
thousand foreign men of Middle Eastern origin residing in their communities to 
determine whether any of them posed a terrorist threat or had useful informa-
tion about possible terrorists.121 
The notion of local police agencies or other state and local institutions be-
ing recruited into a national security function often conjures up images of past 
aggressive snooping and overbroad sweeps of political dissidents.122 Oppo-
nents of federal efforts to enlist local governments in national security intelli-
gence efforts often emphasize the experience of COINTELPRO and other past 
abuses involving federal-local intelligence partnerships, arguing that history 
 
117. Id. at 935. Justice Stevens suggested in dissent that the doctrine should be more 
flexible in national security or emergency contexts. See id. at 940 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
118. As Justice O’Connor explained in her concurrence in Printz: “Congress is . . . free 
to amend the interim program to provide for its continuance on a contractual basis with the 
States if it wishes, as it does with a number of other federal programs.” Id. at 936 
(O’Connor, J., concurring); see also Lynn A. Baker, Conditional Federal Spending and 
States’ Rights, 574 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 104, 106-11 (2001) (arguing that 
federal conditional spending practices threaten state autonomy). 
119. See supra Part I.C.2. 
120. See, e.g., U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 97, at 3 (describing 
standards promulgated by the federal government for state fusion centers receiving grants). 
121. See infra notes 201-03 and accompanying text. 
122. For examples of such historical arguments, see Protecting National Security and 
Civil Liberties: Strategies for Terrorism Information Sharing: Hearing Before the Subcomm. 
on Terrorism and Homeland Sec. of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 111th Cong. 13 (2009) 
(statement of Caroline Fredrickson, Director, Washington Office, ACLU); FBI Joint Terror-
ism Task Force (JTTF), BILL RTS. DEF. COMMITTEE (Apr. 3, 2009, 1:08 PM EDT), http:// 
www.bordc.org/resources/jttf-faq.php. 
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might repeat itself—to the detriment of liberty and without corresponding secu-
rity benefits.123 
Anecdotal examples and some survey data seem to support such accounts. 
From 2005 to 2006, for example, the Maryland State Police allegedly collabo-
rated with the Department of Homeland Security in carrying out surveillance of 
nonviolent political protest groups.124 To critics of state and local cooperation 
with federal intelligence programs, such joint efforts and their attendant dan-
gers seem eerily similar to Cold War abuses uncovered in the 1960s and 
1970s.125 And while state and local governments have been eager to receive 
federal funding, in recent years they have also complained that the strings at-
tached to federal grants and programs are insufficiently attuned to local needs 
and priorities,126 and that national security intelligence law and policy continue 
to be set at the federal level without adequate input from the other levels of 
government charged with implementing them.127 
2. Trickle-down accounts 
Another common account of federal-local national security relations focus-
es not on the direct role of state and local agents in federally directed national 
security programs, but on the effects that recalibrating liberty-security balances 
at the federal level would then have at state and local levels—what might be 
termed a “trickle-down” account. 
Shortly after 9/11, William Stuntz predicted that expanded counterterror-
ism powers at the federal level would erode protections of privacy and other 
freedoms at state and local levels.128 As federal agencies like the FBI asserted 
more powers, so would state and local agencies. Federal courts would likely 
 
123. See, e.g., Robert Dreyfuss, The Cops Are Watching You, NATION, June 3, 2002, at 
12, 14; see also Danielle Keats Citron & Frank Pasquale, Network Accountability for the 
Domestic Intelligence Apparatus, 62 HASTINGS L.J. 1441, 1455-65 (2011); Juliette Kayyem, 
A Waste of Time, BOS. REV., Dec. 2004-Jan. 2005, at 16, 16 (“[T]here is simply no reason to 
believe that the terrorist threat we face today is so pervasive that our entire local and state 
police apparatus must be complicit in the federal government’s overarching efforts.”). 
124. See Madigan, supra note 5; Lisa Rein, Federal Agency Aided Md. Spying; Homel-
and Security Dept. Gave Information to State Police, WASH. POST, Feb. 17, 2009, at B1. 
125. See Jerome H. Skolnick, Democratic Policing Confronts Terror and Protest, 33 
SYRACUSE J. INT’L L. & COM. 191, 194 (2005). 
126. See Eisinger, supra note 19, at 540; Eric Schmitt & David Johnston, States Chaf-
ing at U.S. Focus on Terrorism, N.Y. TIMES, May 26, 2008, at A1. 
127. See HOMELAND SEC. COMM., MAJOR CITIES CHIEFS ASS’N, TWELVE TENETS TO 
PREVENT CRIME AND TERRORISM 9 (2008), available at http://www.majorcitieschiefs.org/ 
pdf/MCC_12TenetFinal52108.pdf (“Since 9/11, a key question has been repeatedly posed: 
Who should be responsible for creating homeland security policies, doctrines, objectives and 
requirements? One default answer has emerged: The federal government should create those 
policies and the states should execute them.”). 
128. See Stuntz, supra note 2, at 2160-91.  
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give the FBI more leeway, and state courts would follow that lead.129 Moreo-
ver, these doctrinal shifts would be transsubstantive, so that adjustments to li-
berty or privacy protection in the national security context would expand to 
other areas of criminal justice or public order.130 
Plenty of empirical and anecdotal data are consistent with the trickle-down 
account.131 Examining state surveillance law, for example, shows that after 
9/11, as the federal government expanded governmental powers through legis-
lation like the USA PATRIOT Act, state governments followed suit and often 
modeled their statutory reforms on the federal legislation.132 
In the wake of 9/11, some major municipal police agencies succeeded in 
petitioning courts for greater surveillance leeway of the sort enjoyed by federal 
agencies, including the shedding of judicially managed consent decrees that 
had been put in place following investigative abuses during earlier eras.133 In 
2002, for instance, the New York Police Department (NYPD) moved to modify 
an agreement that had emerged in the 1980s out of allegations that its intelli-
gence unit had engaged in constitutionally improper surveillance and infiltra-
tion practices, including improper compilation of vast dossiers on individu-
als.134 The NYPD argued to the district court that the resulting restrictions on 
intelligence practices now prevented it from using its surveillance powers be-
fore it was too late to stop an attack.135 The district court agreed, finding that 
“the events of 9/11 and subsequent revelations about international terrorism 
[represent] a significant change in facts mandating modification of the Guide-
lines.”136 
B. Pushback Accounts 
Common to top-down accounts is the idea that national security law and 
policy choices are generally set at the federal level, and that state and local in-
 
129. See id. at 2139.  
130. See id. at 2140-41, 2160; accord Corey Robin, History’s Shadow, BOS. REV., Dec. 
2004-Jan. 2005, at 20. 
131. See Jerry Berman & Lara Flint, Guiding Lights: Intelligence Oversight and Con-
trol for the Challenge of Terrorism, CRIM. JUST. ETHICS, Winter/Spring 2003, at 2, 56. 
132. See Charles H. Kennedy & Peter P. Swire, State Wiretaps and Electronic Surveil-
lance After September 11, 54 HASTINGS L.J. 971, 977-85 (2003). 
133. On the public law litigation that followed disclosure of 1960s and 1970s police in-
telligence abuses in New York City, Chicago, Los Angeles, Seattle, Memphis, Detroit, New 
Jersey, and Michigan, see generally Chevigny, supra note 9, at 744-82. Even before 9/11, the 
Seventh Circuit modified in 2001 a consent decree emplaced decades before to combat 
abuses by Chicago’s infamous “red squads” by restricting police investigations of groups. 
See Alliance to End Repression v. City of Chicago, 237 F.3d 799, 801-02 (7th Cir. 2001). 
134. See Ford Fessenden, Filing Opposes Giving Police More Latitude in Surveillance, 
N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 6, 2002, at A21. 
135. See id. 
136. Handschu v. Special Servs. Div., 273 F. Supp. 2d 327, 337 (S.D.N.Y. 2003). 
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stitutions—the political branches, enforcement agencies, and courts—take their 
cues in this area from the federal government. In other words, involvement of 
state and local institutions in national security policy results in some decentra-
lized execution of that policy, but it tends to suppress localization, or the extent 
to which states and localities set their own legal and policy agendas. These top-
down accounts are limited, however, insofar as they fail to explain some beha-
vior of states and localities in pushing back against federal national security 
agendas. A counternarrative holds that top-down accounts neglect the checks 
that vertical coordination may impose on federal liberty-security rebalancing, 
perhaps even with trickle-up effects of local political preferences on federal law 
and policy. 
State and local involvement can affect national security law and policy in 
several ways, including through their expressive powers and through the leve-
rage exerted by their control of resources residing in local agencies.137 Al-
though neither this local political voice nor operational leverage is likely to be 
as strong and concentrated as federal influence in the national security arena, 
both can affect how law and policy function at the local level and sometimes 
also in subtle ways at the national level. 
In flexing their expressive powers, many local governments have criticized 
aggressive post-9/11 federal national security programs or statutes. For in-
stance, more than four hundred state, county, and city legislatures have passed 
resolutions or laws opposing the USA PATRIOT Act as unduly burdening civil 
liberties and constitutional rights, and in some cases have declared their inten-
tion not to participate in enforcing parts of the Act.138 
There are reasons to be skeptical that such expressive efforts alone have 
any significant practical impact on federal lawmaking; after all, Congress reau-
thorized the PATRIOT Act largely intact in 2005, despite those local expres-
sions of opposition.139 Moreover, so long as state and local governments can 
depend on the federal government to provide a floor of security and can expect 
the federal government to bear political responsibility for security lapses—
issues I take up in more detail below140—state and local legislatures bear little 
political cost and may have much to gain politically by staking out these stri-
dent public positions. That said, civil liberty advocacy groups view local politi-
 
137. See Ernest A. Young, Welcome to the Dark Side: Liberals Rediscover Federalism 
in the Wake of the War on Terror, 69 BROOK. L. REV. 1277, 1285-91 (2004). 
138. See Jessica Bulman-Pozen & Heather K. Gerken, Uncooperative Federalism, 118 
YALE L.J. 1256, 1278 (2009). For a list of resolutions, see Grassroots Opposition to the USA 
PATRIOT Act, BILL RTS. DEF. COMMITTEE (Dec. 7, 2007), http://www.bordc.org/resources/ 
alphalist.pdf. These efforts are reminiscent of resolutions passed in 1798 by the Virginia and 
Kentucky state legislatures condemning the Sedition Act as unconstitutional. STONE, supra 
note 30, at 44-45.  
139. See USA PATRIOT Improvement and Reauthorization Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 
109-177, 120 Stat. 192 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 18 U.S.C.); see also 
Bulman-Pozen & Gerken, supra note 138, at 1280 n.85 (acknowledging these limits). 
140. See infra Part III.B.1. 
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cal efforts as an important vector of legal reform, sometimes accompanying lit-
igation or regulatory actions mobilized at local levels, especially when faced 
with unfavorable odds at the federal level.141 
Beyond expressive efforts, some local governments have pushed back 
more directly—including through their operational policy and practices—
against federal national security efforts they view as too aggressive.142 As men-
tioned above, in the immediate aftermath of 9/11, for example, the Justice De-
partment requested assistance from local police agencies in locating and ques-
tioning thousands of men holding nonimmigrant visas from countries where al 
Qaeda was thought to be active.143 Many local police departments declined to 
participate in the questioning, not wanting to jeopardize relationships with im-
migrant communities.144 In other jurisdictions, local government pressure en-
couraged federal agents to modify their techniques and protocols in carrying 
out the interview program.145 
In 2005, Portland, Oregon, became the first city to remove its law en-
forcement agencies from the FBI-led Joint Terrorism Task Force, as friction 
between the federal and city government escalated: soon after 9/11, Portland 
officials were widely criticized for refusing federal government requests to 
question resident foreigners,146 and in 2003 the city council passed a resolution 
criticizing the PATRIOT Act.147 Key members of the city government worried 
that the Task Force’s surveillance activities, while complying with federal law, 
might not meet more stringent state law standards despite FBI assurances.148 
Nor, due to secrecy rules, could city government leaders oversee whether city 
police officers participating in the Task Force were abiding by agreed-upon 
guidelines.149 The city therefore pulled its participation.150 (Since then, howev-
 
141. See Norman Dorsen & Susan N. Herman, American Federalism and the American 
Civil Liberties Union, in PAPERS FROM THE ELEVENTH ANNUAL LIMAN COLLOQUIUM AT YALE 
LAW SCHOOL, WHY THE LOCAL MATTERS: FEDERALISM, LOCALISM, AND PUBLIC INTEREST 
ADVOCACY 21, 28 (2008).  
142. On state and local resistance to carrying out federal counterterrorism immigration 
policies, see David A. Harris, The War on Terror, Local Police, and Immigration Enforce-
ment: A Curious Tale of Police Power in Post-9/11 America, 38 RUTGERS L.J. 1, 21-44 
(2006). 
143. On this program, see generally U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-03-
459, HOMELAND SECURITY: JUSTICE DEPARTMENT’S PROJECT TO INTERVIEW ALIENS AFTER 
SEPTEMBER 11, 2001 (2003). 
144. See Tyche Hendricks & Suzanne Herel, Terror Probe Interviews Unfinished in 
Bay Area, S.F. CHRON., Dec. 22, 2001, at A7. 
145. See infra notes 202-03 and accompanying text. 
146. See Lynn Marshall & Tom Gorman, Now Portland Comes In for Questioning, L.A. 
TIMES, Nov. 30, 2001, at A1. 
147. See Tomas Alex Tizon, Portland, FBI Unit to Part Ways, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 28, 
2005, at A8. 
148. See Susan N. Herman, Collapsing Spheres: Joint Terrorism Task Forces, Federal-
ism, and the War on Terror, 41 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 941, 947, 952-55 (2005).  
149. See id. at 952-54. 
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er, the attempted bombing of a Portland festival in late 2010, thwarted by an 
FBI sting, has prompted Portland officials to reconsider151 and decide to rejoin 
the task force—but under revised terms that create greater disclosure of police 
participation and impose tighter rules regulating task force activities.152) 
These are among the most well-documented and visible examples of local 
government pushback against federal national security efforts. While more dif-
ficult to study and to assess in the negative, it is also worth considering policies 
or programs that slowed or terminated due to state and local resistance. For ex-
ample, contrary to what the hierarchical or trickle-down accounts would pre-
dict,153 since 9/11 local police have generally refused greater terrorism-related 
immigration authority despite federal efforts to delegate it.154 State govern-
ments have also resisted some federally supported data-sharing initiatives that 
they viewed as too invasive of privacy or otherwise costly.155 
One might dismiss these various examples as merely outliers against an 
overwhelming alignment of local institutions with federal national security ef-
forts. But some scholars argue that they illustrate how state and local govern-
ments can operate as checks on federal policy. 
Somewhat counterintuitively for those used to seeing the federal govern-
ment historically step in to protect civil liberties against state excesses, Ann 
Althouse has suggested that the anticommandeering doctrine announced in 
Printz can work as a safeguard or circuit breaker to protect individual rights in 
national security rebalancing.156 By denying the federal government comman-
 
150. Id. at 955. 
151. See Jim Redden, Should Portland Rejoin Terrorism Task Force?, PORTLAND     
TRIB. (Dec. 11, 2010), http://www.portlandtribune.com/news/print_story.php?story_id= 
129203082526556400. 
152. See Brad Schmidt, Portland City Council Unanimously Approves “As-Needed” 
Involvement with JTTF, OREGONLIVE.COM (Apr. 29, 2011, 10:46 AM), http://blog 
.oregonlive.com/portlandcityhall/2011/04/portland_city_council_unanimou.html. 
153. Cf. Dreyfuss, supra note 123 (arguing that federal policies will drive local counter-
terrorism policies by encouraging state and local governments to exercise greater powers and 
by offering them resources to do so). 
154. See Harris, supra note 142, at 5-7. 
155. The Multi-State Anti-Terrorism Information Exchange (MATRIX), for example, 
was a program launched in 2003 by the U.S. Department of Homeland Security and the Flor-
ida Department of Law Enforcement, with funding from the U.S. Department of Justice. The 
program, which additional states were expected to join, used advanced computer capabilities 
to access, share, and analyze public records to assist counterterrorism intelligence efforts and 
investigation. WILLIAM J. KROUSE, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL32536, THE MULTI-STATE 
ANTI-TERRORISM INFORMATION EXCHANGE (MATRIX) PILOT PROJECT 1-2 (2004). Sixteen 
states participated, but one by one they dropped out over privacy and cost-efficiency con-
cerns. See, e.g., Susan Gast, Matrix and Privacy: Debate over Information Hits Close to 
Home, ATLANTA J.-CONST., Oct. 19, 2003, at 1F (reporting Georgia’s withdrawal); 2 More 
States Turn Against Massive Anticrime Database, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 12, 2004, at A30 (re-
porting New York’s and Wisconsin’s withdrawals). 
156. See Ann Althouse, The Vigor of Anti-Commandeering Doctrine in Times of Ter-
ror, 69 BROOK. L. REV. 1231, 1235 (2004). 
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deering power, “the courts have created an incentive [for Congress] to adopt 
policies that inspire [rather than demand] compliance, thus preserving a benefi-
cial structural safeguard for individual rights.”157 Jessica Bulman-Pozen and 
Heather Gerken argue that these expressions of disagreement or disobedience 
not only shape liberty-security balances within local jurisdictions but also shape 
legal and policy debate at the national level.158 Ernest Young agrees that 
“[f]ederalism best protects liberty over time, through the day-to-day operations 
of a government in which nothing much can get done without the cooperation 
of multiple actors at multiple levels,”159 and that this principle could apply in 
the national security context.160 In other words, the federal government may 
exert some legal and policy tugs on local institutions, but those local institu-
tions may exert their own tugs by responding to local politics in ways that favor 
civil liberties.161 
These perspectives and data points offer a competing narrative to the more 
common top-down accounts, or at least caveats to those accounts. Rather than 
seeing state and local entities as passive players that take their liberty-security 
balancing cues from the federal government, pushback accounts posit a role for 
states and local entities in influencing national legal and policy agendas. 
C. Limits of Leading Accounts 
In top-down accounts, state and local governments are generally suscepti-
ble—perhaps too susceptible—to federal power and influence in the national 
security arena. In pushback accounts, state and local governments retain some 
independent voice and leverage to oppose federal policy and initiatives that 
stray too far from local liberty preferences. Each of these accounts is helpful in 
understanding some of the trends, bureaucratic innovations, and events since 
the 9/11 terrorist attacks. Individually and together, however, they are limited 
in their capacity to explain and assess the complex intergovernmental relations 
that have emerged and continue to evolve. 
Descriptively, these leading accounts are most useful in explaining the 
state and local effects of and reaction to the massive post-9/11 pendulum swing 
of federal policy favoring aggressive counterterrorism efforts. Born of a partic-
ular moment of rapid and dramatic expansion of federal counterterrorism pow-
ers, current narratives often reflect their authors’ policy views that the Bush 
 
157. Id. at 1272. As Susan Herman explains, this turns some political debates on their 
heads, as liberals now see the virtues of federalism. Susan N. Herman, Introduction, 69 
BROOK. L. REV. 1201, 1205-06 (2004).  
158. See Bulman-Pozen & Gerken, supra note 138, at 1278-84.  
159. Young, supra note 137, at 1290. 
160. See id. at 1290, 1311. 
161. Samuel Rascoff cautions against putting too much stock in the role of local police 
as guardians of liberty in the counterterrorism area. See Samuel J. Rascoff, The Law of Ho-
megrown (Counter)Terrorism, 88 TEX. L. REV. 1715, 1722-23 (2010). 
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Administration’s efforts unduly threatened individual rights. As a result, these 
accounts focus heavily on liberty-versus-security metrics, neglecting other pol-
icy values. They also pay little attention to how vertical intergovernmental dy-
namics might function in the national security arena over the long term as the 
liberty-security pendulum continues to swing back and forth. 
Normatively, both top-down and pushback accounts are too narrow in the 
way they assess vertical intergovernmental relations, especially if—as I believe 
they will—state and local roles in national security intelligence become further 
institutionalized. To some subscribers of top-down accounts, the appropriate 
institutional relationship is one of separation: the federal government should 
handle national security intelligence on its own, and mostly leave state and lo-
cal governments unencumbered in meeting their own local policy responsibili-
ties.162 To subscribers of pushback accounts, involvement of state and local 
governments in federal national security efforts is fine, and maybe even benefi-
cial, so long as those governments and agencies retain sufficient autonomy to 
dissent.163 Both of these prescriptive orientations assume that national security 
remains largely the province of federal policy; neither offers much of an affir-
mative role for local governments in contributing to national security law and 
policy formulation or agenda setting in a sustained way. Likewise, neither ac-
counts for the special characteristics—the comparative advantages as well as 
weak spots—of local institutions in that realm. 
In that regard, the leading accounts tend to assume a natural allocation of 
responsibility based on a priori constitutional categories: national security poli-
cy is the domain of the federal government, while local law and order is the 
domain of the states and their components. As Part I concluded, however, this 
neat and tidy division is no longer workable. Moreover, even the way we might 
presumptively allocate government national security duties based on traditional 
constitutional categories or conceptual divisions of responsibility depends on 
how wide a lens we cast on that public policy issue. If we see the national secu-
rity problem as one of finding and neutralizing extremely dangerous individuals 
 
162. See, e.g., Herman, supra note 148, at 943 (“These joint federal and state/local en-
terprises might be viewed as weakening the vertical structures of the United States Constitu-
tion by collapsing previously autonomous spheres.”); Kayyem, supra note 123, at 16 
(“[B]etter to keep the locals out of . . . federal [national security] politics—better to stay on 
the sidelines, to critique and undermine, to refuse and create legal loopholes—than to be part 
of it at all.”); Robin, supra note 130 (warning against liberty dangers of collaboration be-
tween federal and local governments). 
163. See, e.g., Althouse, supra note 156, at 1261 (“[T]he ability of state and local gov-
ernment to resist being commandeered creates pressure on the federal government not to go 
too far, not to put too low a value on individual liberty . . . .”); Bulman-Pozen & Gerken, su-
pra note 138, at 1280 (arguing that states “use their policymaking authority to thwart the Pa-
triot Act’s provisions, something that is possible only because the federal government relies 
on the states for enforcement assistance”); Young, supra note 137, at 1288 (“[A]nti-
commandeering doctrine . . . creates the constitutional space for state and local governments 
to vindicate their own, possibly broader understandings of these rights by refusing to partici-
pate in federal enforcement efforts they consider suspect.”). 
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or groups violently opposed to the government, and therefore the key tasks as 
collecting and analyzing information about those individuals or groups, then it 
is easy to look to the federal government as the major locus of responsibility. If, 
however, we step back and view the problem not only as collecting, sharing, 
and analyzing information but also cultivating the relationships with communi-
ties likely to provide information to the government, then responsibility is more 
naturally situated at various levels of government, including the local level. If 
we step back even further and view the problem as including how to identify 
and address social alienation and other factors that may contribute to terrorism 
and other forms of violent extremism, then responsibility might naturally fit 
even more comfortably at the local level of governance, which has significant 
responsibility for basic social policy and services including education, commu-
nity relations, and public welfare. 
Immigration federalism offers some useful parallels in that regard, because 
until recently immigration law and policy were viewed so strongly as exclu-
sively federal domains, a view that also has roots in the idea that immigration is 
linked inextricably with foreign policy and national defense.164 In challenging 
Arizona’s aggressive immigration enforcement laws passed in 2010 as 
preempted by federal law, for example, the federal government argued that to 
permit varying state immigration policies would impermissibly interfere with 
its balance of “uniquely national interests and priorities.”165 Recently some 
scholars have called into question such hard, bright-line constitutional dividing 
lines of responsibility, though, because effective immigration policy and en-
forcement depends heavily on state and local government participation166—and 
that state and local participation draws on uniquely local capabilities and is 
shaped by diverse local politics and institutional pressures.167 
Besides viewing too narrowly the roles that local governments might play 
in setting and implementing national security policy, the leading accounts are 
generally based on a narrow and static view of the terrorism threat. The threat 
itself is evolving, which is one reason why it is difficult to characterize terror-
ism as either a national problem with local dimensions or a local problem with 
national and international dimensions—the threat is in fact some combination 
of both.168 That evolution will affect the way we think about which public in-
 
164. See Chae Chan Ping v. United States, 130 U.S. 581, 606-10 (1889). 
165. Plaintiff’s Motion for a Preliminary Injunction and Memorandum of Law in Sup-
port Thereof at 19, United States v. Arizona, 703 F. Supp. 2d 980 (D. Ariz. 2010) (No. 2:10-
cv-1413-NVW), 2010 WL 2959365.  
166. See Peter H. Schuck, Taking Immigration Federalism Seriously, 2007 U. CHI. 
LEGAL F. 57, 72. 
167. Cristina Rodríguez argues that “immigration control occurs through a de facto 
multi-sovereign regime” in which state and local governments’ participation is inevitably 
shaped by local conditions and competing policy demands. Cristina M. Rodríguez, The Sig-
nificance of the Local in Immigration Regulation, 106 MICH. L. REV. 567, 609-10 (2008). 
168. See PETER BERGEN & BRUCE HOFFMAN, ASSESSING THE TERRORIST THREAT: A 
REPORT OF THE BIPARTISAN POLICY CENTER’S NATIONAL SECURITY PREPAREDNESS GROUP 1, 
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stitutions should take the lead and about the balance of influence between fed-
eral and state or local institutions. 
As alluded to above, the dramatic legal, policy, and bureaucratic changes 
following the 9/11 attacks were driven by a transnational terrorist network pri-
marily based, operating, and sustained abroad. Since those attacks, however, 
there have been indications of a possible growing domestic terrorism threat 
within the United States that may be inspired ideologically from abroad but not 
controlled or even directly supported by foreign terrorist organizations.169 This 
assessment is hotly debated among terrorism experts,170 though recent terror-
ism attempts seem to confirm the prospect that indigenous activities could form 
a significant part of the future terrorism threat.171 
The more that terrorism threats include domestic, and perhaps homegrown, 
elements, the stronger reliance on local government intelligence will likely be-
come.172 This is a different point from the familiar refrain that local govern-
ments play a critical role in preventing terrorism generally; rather, it is a point 
about the specific type and character of emergent terrorism threats and the ways 
the structure and nature of that threat could and should influence the distribu-
tion of responsibilities among levels of government. As a 2007 U.S. govern-
ment intelligence assessment put it: “The ability to detect broader and more di-
verse terrorist plotting in this environment will challenge . . . the tools we use to 
detect and disrupt plots” and “will . . . require greater understanding of how 
suspect activities at the local level relate to strategic threat information and how 
best to identify indicators of terrorist activity in the midst of legitimate interac-
tions.”173 For example, because local police are better versed in the activities of 
their communities and often have better networks of relationships with other 
 
3 (2010), available at http://www.bipartisanpolicy.org/sites/default/files/NSPG%20Final 
%20Threat%20Assessment.pdf. 
169. See NEUMANN, supra note 76, at 12; Sebastian Rotella, U.S. Sees Homegrown 
Muslim Extremism as Rising Threat, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 7, 2009, at A1. 
170. See PATEL, supra note 72, at 5-7. A recent RAND report notes that “[w]hile radica-
lization and recruitment to jihadist terrorism are cause for continuing concern, . . . [t]he vo-
lume of domestic terrorist activity was much greater in the 1970s than it is today.” BRIAN 
MICHAEL JENKINS, WOULD-BE WARRIORS: INCIDENTS OF JIHADIST TERRORIST 
RADICALIZATION IN THE UNITED STATES SINCE SEPTEMBER 11, 2001, at viii (2010), available 
at www.rand.org/pubs/occasional_papers/2010/RAND_OP292.pdf.  
171. See JEROME P. BJELOPERA & MARK A. RANDOL, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R41416, 
AMERICAN JIHADIST TERRORISM: COMBATING A COMPLEX THREAT 1-2 (2010). But see Ro-
mesh Ratnesar, The Myth of Homegrown Islamic Terrorism, TIME (Jan. 24, 2011), 
http://www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,2044047,00.html (contesting claims that 
homegrown terrorism is a significant threat). 
172. According to Brian Michael Jenkins of the RAND Corporation, “As [terrorism] 
metastasizes, cops are it. We’re going to win this at the local level.” William Finnegan, The 
Terrorism Beat: How Is the N.Y.P.D. Defending the City?, NEW YORKER, July 25, 2005, at 
58, 61; see also The Next 5 Years, supra note 89, at 19 (“In combating ‘homegrown’ threats, 
the burden shifts . . . almost entirely to local law enforcement.”). 
173. NAT’L INTELLIGENCE COUNCIL, THE TERRORIST THREAT TO THE US HOMELAND 6 
(2007), available at http://www.dni.gov/press_releases/20070717_release.pdf. 
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local institutions and actors than do federal agents, some purely domestic 
threats are more likely to be uncovered through observations by local law en-
forcement agents and programs or tips originating from relevant neighbor-
hoods.174 By contrast, international terrorist networks—especially those, like al 
Qaeda, that are controlled or supported by a central core—are more detectable 
by federal communications monitoring and through centralized analysis that 
assembles disparate pieces of information.175 
At the same time that we may see evolution of the terrorism threat, gov-
ernment counterterrorism strategy may adjust, too, and in ways that shift re-
sponsibility to local levels.176 For example, to the extent that counterterrorism 
strategies adapt to include addressing social alienation and other factors that 
may give rise to violent extremism, responsibility naturally fits more comforta-
bly at the local level of governance, which has significant responsibility for so-
cial policy and, therefore, the instruments for managing it. As explained at the 
conclusion of Part III, an emphasis on “counter-radicalization”—or efforts to 
stop the social processes that give rise to terrorism—would likely involve local 
institutions, which have better visibility of and access to relevant communities 
and influential actors within them.177 
In other words, harnessing state and local institutions for national security 
may be needed not merely to bolster efforts otherwise naturally in the domain 
of the federal government, but to address parts of the national security chal-
lenge for which state and local institutions are better suited than the federal 
government could ever be. The leading accounts of federal-local relations and 
national security do not adequately incorporate these features into their        
analyses. 
 
*   *   * 
 
Many leading accounts of the vertical dimension of national security inter-
governmental relations see legal and policy decisionmaking as top-down, with 
state and local governments largely taking their cues about balancing liberty 
and security from the federal government. Other leading accounts emphasize 
that state and local governments can and do sometimes push back against fed-
 
174. See NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, PROTECTING INDIVIDUAL PRIVACY IN THE 
STRUGGLE AGAINST TERRORISTS 16 (2008). Rascoff argues, for example, that local agencies 
“see” terrorism threats differently than federal ones do, and together they may develop a 
more complete and accurate assessment. Rascoff, supra note 161, at 1725-31. 
175. See NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 174, at 16. 
176. See BERGEN & HOFFMAN, supra note 168, at 30 (“Who in fact has responsibility in 
the U.S. government to identify radicalization when it is occurring and then to interdict at-
tempts at recruitment? Is this best done by federal law enforcement . . . or state and local ju-
risdictions working closely with federal authorities? What is the role of state and local gov-
ernments?”). 
177. See infra Part III.C. 
WAXMAN 64 STAN. L. REV. 289 (DO NOT DELETE) 2/16/2012 3:54 PM 
February 2012] NATIONAL SECURITY FEDERALISM 323 
eral policy. While each has some explanatory value, however, those leading ac-
counts are limited in their capacity to describe emergent intergovernmental re-
lations and to guide reforms. 
How should federal-local relations be structured and managed for the long 
term, in which threats and political responses to them will continue to evolve? 
What other values besides liberty-security balances are at stake in structuring 
vertical intergovernmental relations with respect to national security intelli-
gence? The next Part takes up these questions. 
III. NATIONAL SECURITY FEDERALISM IN THE AGE OF TERROR 
This Part addresses gaps in leading accounts of vertical national security 
relations and builds on Part II’s observations about the nature of contemporary 
terrorism threats by turning to some familiar arguments about federalism. The 
leading accounts already draw on federalism tropes in thinking about how to 
safeguard liberty: both top-down and pushback accounts see state autonomy as 
important to preserving rights or as a counterweight to federal power. This Part 
takes the federalism analysis further. 
Specifically, this Part focuses on how governmental building blocks should 
be structured vertically to set appropriate policy balances and better ensure that 
those policy balances are carried out effectively. Such a focus on institutional 
structure and arrangements is important because liberty and security are only 
two among many policy values to be defended and balanced, and these bal-
ances require recalibration over time in an environment fraught with uncertain-
ties. It is also important because actors at each level have particular characteris-
tics—including some competencies and advantages as well as some 
shortcomings—relevant to these policy challenges. Given the deeply rooted 
vertical division and localization of American policing powers and the nature 
of terrorism challenges, this Part accepts that a significant degree of national 
security federalism will likely endure, and asks how we can make the most     
of it. 
Among many federalism proponents, state and local authority—or de-
volved and distributed rather than national authority—is widely held to carry a 
range of virtues besides serving as a check on expansive federal power. Dele-
gating policy authority to states is often thought, for example, to enhance polit-
ical accountability by linking policy more closely to affected populations and to 
improve policy effectiveness by tailoring policies to local conditions and pro-
moting experimentation.178 These values are also often ascribed to local gover-
 
178. As Justice O’Connor explained in Gregory v. Ashcroft, “the federalist system is a 
check on abuses of government power”; it helps ensure that government “will be more sensi-
tive to the diverse needs of a heterogeneous society; it increases opportunity for citizen in-
volvement in democratic processes; it allows for more innovation and experimentation in 
government; and it makes government more responsive by putting the States in competition 
for a mobile citizenry.” 501 U.S. 452, 458 (1991). On the virtues of federalism and counte-
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nance. “Indeed,” Richard Briffault observes, “it would seem that the characte-
ristics of the states and of federalism that promote these values are even more 
pronounced at the local level.”179 
There is something almost oxymoronic about the notion of “national secu-
rity federalism.” Besides the vision of distributed authority as a check on go-
vernmental power that runs through so many of the leading accounts discussed 
in Part II, however, two other visions of federalism merit close attention in this 
context. One vision focuses on accountability, or political responsiveness, both 
as a means toward achieving appropriate balances among policy values (includ-
ing, but not limited to, liberty and security) and also as an independent norma-
tive value in itself. A second vision is concerned with the economics of public 
policy allocations, and how the distribution of decisionmaking between units of 
government relates to policy costs and benefits (including who bears what and 
the effects of scale on those tradeoffs). 
These are not the only alternative frames to the standard narratives and 
counternarratives emphasizing liberty-versus-security balancing and strong-
versus-weak checks on federal power. But together with these leading narra-
tives, these alternative frames help illuminate special features of national secu-
rity federalism and offer new ways for understanding, assessing, and improving 
emergent intelligence structures. 
A. Accountability and National Security Intelligence 
One common view of federalism holds that authority should be allocated 
and arranged among levels of government to promote responsiveness to the go-
verned or to promote clarity for the public about whom (including what level of 
government) to hold responsible for actions or inactions.180 In the national se-
curity context, this view prompts questions over whether integration of state 
and local institutions into intelligence programs and functions enhances or de-
grades the public’s ability to participate meaningfully in self-government 
through the political process. 
 
rarguments, see generally DAVID L. SHAPIRO, FEDERALISM: A DIALOGUE (1995); Barry 
Friedman, Valuing Federalism, 82 MINN. L. REV. 317 (1997); Deborah Jones Merritt, The 
Guarantee Clause and State Autonomy: Federalism for a Third Century, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 
1, 2-10 (1988).  
179. Briffault, supra note 17, at 1312; see also Gerald E. Frug, The City as a Legal 
Concept, 93 HARV. L. REV. 1057, 1067-73 (1980) (discussing local autonomy as important 
to public participation). 
180. This view is reflected in the anticommandeering cases. See Printz v. United States, 
521 U.S. 898, 920-21 (1997); New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 168-69 (1992); see 
also Friedman, supra note 178, at 394 (“Accountability in a democracy means responsive-
ness on the part of those petitioned.”); Vicki C. Jackson, Federalism and the Uses and Limits 
of Law: Printz and Principle?, 111 HARV. L. REV. 2180, 2205 (1998) (noting that “[f]ederal 
commandeering of states . . . can risk confusing the lines of political accountability”).  
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Comparing national security intelligence to other public policy areas in 
which devolution of political authority is thought to improve political respon-
siveness of government highlights the specific challenges attendant to secrecy 
and uncertainty in the national security context. More importantly, though, 
there are other types of accountability that are especially salient in this context, 
including promoting reasoned deliberation and monitoring compliance with law 
and policy to prevent abuses or misuses of power;181 and there will sometimes 
be tradeoffs among these types of accountability.182 While vertical intergo-
vernmental arrangements in the national security intelligence context should be 
sensitive to the values and risks of political responsiveness, they should also be 
especially geared to enhance those other forms of accountability. This Subpart 
proposes some ways to do so. 
1. Accountability and political processes 
In thinking about the accountability values of federalism and national secu-
rity, a good place to start is the familiar debate about criminal justice federal-
ism. That debate provides not just an analogy, but also some empirical insights, 
because there is so much substantive and institutional overlap between criminal 
justice and national security intelligence. Both involve law enforcement agen-
cies combating threats to public order and safety183—indeed, many states have 
their own criminal statutes against terrorism offenses184—though “national se-
curity” functions might be distinguished on account of features including the 
high magnitude, political purpose, and national and international consequences 
of the threat involved. 
Proponents of criminal justice federalism usually regard local political dy-
namics as critical to a normative vision of law enforcement and policing that is 
responsive and tailored to local preferences and citizen demands.185 This em-
phasis fits especially comfortably with anticommandeering doctrine and the 
Supreme Court’s rhetorical accent that the federal and state governments 
should be organized as acoustically distinct entities—separately accountable, 
 
181. On the various forms of accountability, see generally Jerry L. Mashaw, Accounta-
bility and Institutional Design: Some Thoughts on the Grammar of Governance, in PUBLIC 
ACCOUNTABILITY: DESIGNS, DILEMMAS AND EXPERIENCES 115 (Michael W. Dowdle ed., 
2006). 
182. See id. at 132, 154. 
183. See Thomas E. Feucht et al., Policing, Terrorism, and Beyond, in TO PROTECT AND 
TO SERVE: POLICING IN THE AGE OF TERRORISM, supra note 14, at 203, 204. 
184. See Laura K. Donohue & Juliette N. Kayyem, Federalism and the Battle over 
Counterterrorist Law: State Sovereignty, Criminal Law Enforcement, and National Security, 
25 STUD. CONFLICT & TERRORISM 1, 1-8 (2002). 
185. See TASK FORCE ON THE FEDERALIZATION OF CRIMINAL LAW, ABA, THE 
FEDERALIZATION OF CRIMINAL LAW 43 (1998).  
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therefore, to the citizenry for the benefits and burdens of criminal justice       
policies.186 
Legal scholars frequently question political accountability arguments for 
federalism in general as overstating empirically the way citizens assign credit 
or blame for decisionmaking.187 However, in the criminal justice context spe-
cifically, many policing scholars believe that local politics plays a significant 
role in shaping policy and constraining police behavior (though recent scholar-
ship also emphasizes professionalization and institutional pressures that play 
out at local levels).188 “It has long been accepted,” according to one major trea-
tise on law enforcement and democracy, “that the best way to maintain the ac-
countability of the police is to keep the lines between the local community and 
the police department as short as possible.”189 “The main consequence of 
America’s decentralized system,” writes James Q. Wilson, “is that public opi-
nion closely watches and deeply influences law enforcement.”190 Most police 
agencies are locally financed and controlled, and are subject to direction and 
oversight by officials elected by and responsible to the communities they 
serve.191 Combined with the institutional pressures and professional orienta-
tions of modern community policing trends, which emphasize partnership with 
local communities,192 these political arrangements are often believed to make 
police agencies and their policies responsive to local demands and                
preferences.193 
 
186. See Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 930 (1997); see also New York v. Unit-
ed States, 505 U.S. 144, 169 (1992). 
187. See Bulman-Pozen & Gerken, supra note 138, at 1289-90; Roderick M. Hills, Jr., 
The Political Economy of Cooperative Federalism: Why State Autonomy Makes Sense and 
“Dual Sovereignty” Doesn’t, 96 MICH. L. REV. 813, 828 (1998). 
188. See Paul G. Lewis & S. Karthick Ramakrishnan, Police Practices in Immigrant-
Destination Cities: Political Control or Bureaucratic Professionalism?, 42 URB. AFF. REV. 
874, 877 (2007). But see David Alan Sklansky, Police and Democracy, 103 MICH. L. REV. 
1699, 1810-14 (2005) (presenting evidence questioning theories that localized policing en-
hances accountability). 
189. See BREWER ET AL., supra note 82, at 115; see also HERMAN GOLDSTEIN, POLICING 
A FREE SOCIETY 131-43 (1977) (discussing localized political control of American policing). 
But see Richard T. Ford, Police Don’t Fight Wars, BOS. REV., Dec. 2004-Jan. 2005, at 19, 19 
(“True, local police are more likely to be more accountable to local constituencies than fed-
eral agents, but local police also tend to be most responsive to the local communities that are 
least likely to be victims of police abuse and most likely to fear the effects of violent 
crime.”). 
190. James Q. Wilson, Criminal Justice, in UNDERSTANDING AMERICA: THE ANATOMY 
OF AN EXCEPTIONAL NATION 475, 476 (Peter H. Schuck & James Q. Wilson eds., 2008); see 
also William J. Stuntz, Terrorism, Federalism, and Police Misconduct, 25 HARV. J.L. & PUB. 
POL’Y 665, 670 (2002) (“The single biggest constraint on local police behavior is local poli-
tics . . . .”). 
191. See Wilson, supra note 190, at 476. 
192. See Lewis & Ramakrishnan, supra note 188, at 881. 
193. See BREWER ET AL., supra note 82, at 115; NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 
82, at 51. This is not to minimize the dangers of racial or ethnic biases in local policing, nor 
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Applying a normative vision of devolved political accountability and re-
cognizing that the localization of policing in the United States is widely cre-
dited with enhancing the accountability of state and local law enforcement 
agencies, there are several reasons to be concerned about the emergent national 
security architecture.194 First, current efforts to incorporate state and local gov-
ernments into national security programs could cloud the information necessary 
for effective public accountability from the federal level down to the local. 
Some critics of joint federal-local counterterrorism programs and overlapping 
federal and local responsibilities for national security intelligence worry that 
citizens can no longer be so certain whom to credit or blame for invasive coun-
terterrorism policies and programs.195 Even if vigilant members of the public or 
civic groups tried to untangle complex lines of authority, they might find the 
necessary information delineating federal and local government roles inaccess-
ible.196 For example, with few exceptions, the memoranda of understanding 
that spell out the terms of cooperation for Joint Terrorism Task Forces are not 
publicly available.197 Moreover, as discussed further below, the details of many 
national security intelligence programs are often secret.198 This opacity runs in 
obvious tension with local accountability premised on informed citizenries. 
Second, current efforts to incorporate state and local governments into na-
tional security programs may undermine the public’s capacity to exercise polit-
ical clout by distorting the costs and benefits of government decisions in the 
political marketplace.199 Because federal-local national security cooperation 
entails opportunities for state and local governments to gain resources, informa-
tion, stature, and other goods in return for collaboration, the pull of public de-
mand on law enforcement decisionmaking at the local level is diluted. 
 
the fact that in the past federal intervention and enforcement has been needed to combat state 
and local discrimination, which has sometimes been defended under the banner of “states’ 
rights.” See Young, supra note 137, at 1277. 
Community policing also has its skeptics and detractors, and much controversy exists 
over how effective these strategies are, especially with respect to perceived legitimacy 
among communities. See NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 82, at 329 (calling for more 
research in this area); Sklansky, supra note 188, at 1810-14 (critically analyzing community 
policing and its democratic legitimacy). 
194. Cf. Bulman-Pozen & Gerken, supra note 138, at 1291 (“[A]ccountability is not 
simply about knowing who is responsible, but also being able to appeal to them.”). 
195. See Herman, supra note 148, at 942-43. 
196. See Citron & Pasquale, supra note 123, at 1453-55 (arguing that fusion centers un-
dermine accountability by blurring lines of authority). 
197. See Herman, supra note 148, at 951 (explaining that the terms of Joint Terrorism 
Task Force agreements are usually kept secret); Alasdair Roberts, Big Brother Keeps Secrets 
Under Wraps, POST-STANDARD (Syracuse), Dec. 19, 2004, at C1 (discussing unsuccessful 
efforts by civil liberties advocates to obtain agreement documents under the Freedom of In-
formation Act).  
198. See infra notes 211-13 and accompanying text. 
199. See Waxman, supra note 8, at 393-95 (arguing that some federal intervention in 
state and local counterterrorism efforts might be viewed as correcting a distorted political 
market). 
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Neither of these accountability concerns is new or unique to national secu-
rity. In many other areas of criminal justice policy, such as violent crime and 
narcotics, the federal government has intervened with its own law enforcement 
resources, grants, training programs, and joint operational activities.200 But, the 
argument might go, vertical national security arrangements exacerbate political 
accountability challenges in degree (greater distortion of the political market-
place) and kind (greater secrecy or obscuring of important information). 
While there are several reasons to be concerned about the emergent nation-
al security architecture, however, shared federal-local responsibility also carries 
opportunities to enhance accountability. Rather than federal-local collaboration 
blurring lines of responsibility or spoiling local government responsiveness, 
perhaps local accountability mechanisms are sufficiently robust that they can 
boost accountability from the local to the national level. 
As an example of how this might work, consider the handling of the Justice 
Department’s immigrant interview requests after 9/11 by the police department 
of Dearborn, Michigan, a city near Detroit that contains a high concentration of 
Arab-Americans.201 Investigation of that episode reveals that concerns about 
community trust influenced the way the city government participated in the in-
terviews: local police declined to conduct interviews themselves, worked hard 
to explain their participation in a qualified way, and ultimately adopted a role 
of representing community concerns and monitoring the activities of federal 
agents.202 The role of local police in Dearborn and elsewhere was shaped by 
their interest in setting boundaries on intelligence- and information-gathering 
efforts that threatened to undermine relationships with elements of the Arab 
community they had worked hard to develop, whereas federal agencies (with a 
narrower mandate toward that community) had less at stake in protecting those 
relationships.203 
The ensuing resistance from local institutions favoring a less aggressive 
approach at least affected policy execution in that jurisdiction, and over time 
similar federal-local contestation in many other jurisdictions might have contri-
buted to shifts in federal practices and policy with regard to intelligence collec-
tion and Muslim communities.204 Such shifts in federal policy and practice 
 
200. See Daniel Richman, The Past, Present, and Future of Violent Crime Federalism, 
34 CRIME & JUST. 377, 382-400 (2006). 
201. Detroit, Michigan, is home to a large Arab-American community, and its police 
forces were sensitive about disrupting their relations with them. See Siobhan Gorman, De-
troit Finds Some Answers, NAT’L J., Mar. 29, 2003, at 998; Shannon McCaffrey, New FBI 
Sweep Worries Muslims, DETROIT FREE PRESS, May 27, 2004, at A1. 
202. Thacher, supra note 84, at 661-62. 
203. See id.; Fox Butterfield, Police Are Split on Questioning of Mideast Men, N.Y. 
TIMES, Nov. 22, 2001, at A1. 
204. See Karen DeYoung, Distrust Hinders FBI in Outreach to Muslims; Effort Aimed 
at Homegrown Terrorism, WASH. POST, Feb. 8, 2007, at A1 (discussing FBI outreach efforts 
to Muslim communities and noting that “[a]s the FBI and Muslims wrestle toward accom-
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prompted by local pressure would represent a “trickle-up” phenomenon that 
bolsters accountability, tying policy and practice more tightly to local prefe-
rences and countering the trickle-down effect predicted by some leading ac-
counts discussed earlier.205 
This more sanguine scenario for accountability relies on local governments 
as important entry points for public political participation. Even if new vertical 
arrangements inhibit the public’s ability to discern exactly which level of gov-
ernment is ultimately responsible for policies, that informational deficit, the ar-
gument might go, is offset by greater and more direct public voice in shaping 
those policies and the way they are carried out.206 
In part this debate comes down to empirical judgments, the data for which 
is sorely lacking. The answer is also likely to vary from locale to locale be-
cause, among other reasons, populations that may be especially burdened by 
intelligence efforts (such as Muslim communities) will be better represented or 
subjected to more intense prejudices in some places than others, and because 
states and localities are governed by diverse institutional arrangements and pol-
itics. However, this debate also raises deeper questions of what sort of accoun-
tability we expect and desire when national security is at stake, and what is the 
appropriate political unit or units for that accounting. 
As described above, federalism discussions usually emphasize a particular 
type of accountability: responsiveness to the demands of the governed, defined 
in terms of a given political unit (a city, a state, a nation). With respect to na-
tional security and intelligence, however, there are several reasons why a sim-
ple model of government actors responding to public preferences is particularly 
unlikely to function effectively. Alternative modes of accountability therefore 
take on additional urgency. 
First, the costs and benefits of national security programs are especially 
difficult for the public to discern.207 With respect to most other police func-
tions, local political pressures shape or constrain local policing because gov-
ernment actions and the problems at which they are directed are often observa-
ble and sometimes easily measurable.208 Police patrols and stops or arrests, for 
example, are visible to the public eye and affect local communities in direct and 
 
modation, local law enforcement officials have come to occupy a safe middle ground for 
both”). 
205. See supra Part II.A.2. 
206. See Richman, supra note 200, at 419. 
207. Moreover, this is a policy area in which public pressures and political incentives 
are especially likely to result in overreactions to perceived threats. See JOHN MUELLER, 
OVERBLOWN: HOW POLITICIANS AND THE TERRORISM INDUSTRY INFLATE NATIONAL SECURITY 
THREATS, AND WHY WE BELIEVE THEM 33-43 (2006); CASS R. SUNSTEIN, WORST-CASE 
SCENARIOS 42-44 (2007). Therefore, it may be advantageous to arrange institutions in ways 
that buffer or insulate policy from public opinion swings. 
208. See JEROME H. SKOLNICK, ON DEMOCRATIC POLICING 4-5 (Ideas in American Po-
licing, No. 4, 1999), available at http://www.policefoundation.org/pdf/62.pdf (emphasizing 
the role of transparency in regulating police). 
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tangible ways; crime rates and disorder are measurable and subject to compari-
son over time.209 By contrast, national security benefits, such as effectively de-
terring or disrupting terrorist planning, lack good publicly observable metrics 
or baselines other than defining “success” in terms of nonevents.210 
Second, a significant part of the government’s work in this area is secret. 
By nature and design, much intelligence work is often clandestine or opaque, 
shielded from public (and, more importantly, enemy) view.211 Even when the 
general policy is transparent, the operational details—which sometimes go to 
such critical and controversial questions as how and against whom intelligence 
is collected—may not be.212 With respect to secretive activities, it is impossible 
to rely on standard mechanisms of direct political accountability that assume an 
informed citizenry.213 
Third, with respect to domestic security and intelligence, many costs of 
government action are likely to be concentrated locally to provide benefits 
elsewhere or benefits that are very broadly distributed. For example, expensive 
efforts to disrupt terrorist activities through surveillance (in terms of resources, 
liberty, disruption of relations with immigrant or minority communities, etc.) in 
one locale may produce security elsewhere or for the entire nation214—an issue 
developed further in the next Subpart.215 Alternatively, the costs of providing a 
benefit to one locale can spill over into other locales. Whether one thinks about 
national security in terms of a community’s physical and psychological safety 
or as a nationwide public good, costs and benefits are not borne or distributed 
evenly. And, much more so than with respect to routine criminal justice, states 
and localities have to invest in activities that generate little easily visible benefit 
to any particular community.216 
 
209. See Richman, supra note 200, at 378. 
210. See BUREAU OF JUSTICE ASSISTANCE, supra note 45, at 21 (“One reason why intel-
ligence operations are not always understood or appreciated is because they cannot be eva-
luated by traditional measures of law enforcement success . . . .”); Skolnick, supra note 125, 
at 203 (“Unlike crime, which is the familiar, inevitable, and measurable part of the police 
assignment, there are no measures of success against terrorism except the absence of at-
tack.”). 
211. See Banks & Bowman, supra note 29, at 5. 
212. See, e.g., In re City of New York, 607 F.3d 923, 928 (2d Cir. 2010) (granting the 
city’s petition for a writ of mandamus overturning the district court’s order compelling pro-
duction of confidential intelligence reports prepared prior to the 2004 Republican National 
Convention). 
213. See BRUCE RUSSETT, CONTROLLING THE SWORD: THE DEMOCRATIC GOVERNANCE 
OF NATIONAL SECURITY 147-48 (1990); Deborah N. Pearlstein, Form and Function in the 
National Security Constitution, 41 CONN. L. REV. 1549, 1578 (2009).  
214. See Richman, supra note 200, at 410-11; Thacher, supra note 84, at 637-38. 
215. See infra Part III.B. 
216. Cf. Robert O. Keohane et al., Democracy-Enhancing Multilateralism, 63 INT’L 
ORG. 1, 7 (2009) (“In situations involving a public good that no individual group has an in-
centive to provide on its own, the resulting policy may be more representative of diffuse 
general interests and majority preference that pass the test of public deliberation . . . .”). 
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2. National security accountability as reasoned deliberation 
None of these factors is entirely unique to national security law and policy, 
but they are all intensified in that area. It is therefore not surprising that “ac-
countability” in other national security law contexts (such as war powers or 
foreign intelligence operations) is usually defined and emphasized in ways be-
sides subjection to public scrutiny, including processes to ensure effective deli-
beration.217 This is certainly not to deny that public responsiveness is also an 
important component of accountability in national security policymaking.218 
But scholars who study structural design or allocation of authority in the na-
tional security context often stress a deliberative component of accountability, 
or the desirability of checking the natural tendency of security institutions to-
ward excesses or ill-advised policies—with processes and structural arrange-
ments that require persuasive justifications for actions—especially when high 
degrees of secrecy preclude direct public appraisal.219 
In this light, accountability analysis of national security federalism takes on 
a new dimension. Besides the degree to which governmental agents are respon-
sive to public preferences—indeed, in some tension with that responsiveness—
much of the potential accountability value of integrating local institutions into 
the national security architecture lies in processes of interlevel policy delibera-
tion and validation.  
With regard to horizontal arrangements among the executive, Congress, 
and courts, interbranch participation not only helps ensure broad-based politi-
cal support for policies but also subjects executive action to scrutiny and as-
sessment by other branches with shared responsibilities but distinct institutional 
perspectives and incentives. Similar arguments have been made recently in the 
administrative law context regarding the value of internal executive branch 
checks.220 These sorts of deliberative processes within the governmental archi-
tecture are especially important when, due to secrecy or other difficulties in 
public appraisal or scrutiny, electoral politics or public pressures function poor-
ly as a check. 
 
217. See, e.g., HAROLD HONGJU KOH, THE NATIONAL SECURITY CONSTITUTION: 
SHARING POWER AFTER THE IRAN-CONTRA AFFAIR 161-66 (1990) (discussing “internal” and 
“external” mechanisms of accountability for national security decisionmaking); Pearlstein, 
supra note 213, at 1578. 
218. See KOH, supra note 217, at 111-12. 
219. See id. at 153; David Golove & Stephen Holmes, Terrorism and Accountability: 
Why Checks and Balances Apply Even in “The War on Terrorism,” N.Y.U. REV. L. & 
SECURITY, Apr. 2004, at 2, 6; Neal Kumar Katyal, Internal Separation of Powers: Checking 
Today’s Most Dangerous Branch from Within, 115 YALE L.J. 2314, 2348 (2006). 
220. See, e.g., Katyal, supra note 219, at 2317 (arguing that overlapping mandates of 
executive branch national security bureaucracies leads to better decisionmaking through dis-
cussion and debate); Gillian E. Metzger, The Interdependent Relationship Between Internal 
and External Separation of Powers, 59 EMORY L.J. 423, 429-30 (2009) (arguing that internal 
executive branch checks are important to ensuring depoliticization, harnessing expertise, and 
fostering consideration of different perspectives in administrative decisionmaking). 
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In similar ways, vertical, interlevel participation among federal, state, and 
local governments—while perhaps even cutting against a vision of direct public 
accountability by blurring lines of responsibility or spreading political risk—
could subject collaborative policies to mutual review and validation by institu-
tions with overlapping responsibilities but differing political pressures, as each 
level works to build and maintain the support of the others for its programs.221 
Here, scholars of national security institutions and scholars of federalism each 
have something important to offer, insofar as the former often study structures 
for policymaking when secrecy or low measurability trumps transparency, and 
the latter often study cooperative arrangements among levels of government 
amid robust political marketplaces. 
By way of illustration, consider the differing responsibilities of the FBI and 
local police agencies, both of which are law enforcement institutions also 
charged with an intelligence function, and consider the way each level devises 
guidelines on the appropriate scope of investigations. In some respects, the 
FBI’s mandate is broader than that of local police, as it includes combating 
threats like foreign espionage and foreign computer intrusion222 that lie outside 
the scope of local responsibility or the technical capacity of local governments 
to confront. With that mandate in mind, federal investigatory guidelines, which 
are subject to periodic revision to expand or contract the government’s authori-
ty to monitor individuals or groups perceived as threats, are generally thought 
of primarily in terms of national security tradeoffs with privacy and free ex-
pression.223 In other respects, however, local police mandates are much broader 
than those of federal law enforcement agencies, because in addition to investi-
gating specific crimes, local police functions also include maintaining order, 
patrolling, and directly providing community services that federal agencies do 
not.224 Legal or policy decisions that might easily be framed at the federal level 
in terms of balancing security and liberty might, at the local level, involve ba-
lancing a more dense and heterogeneous array of policy imperatives and politi-
cal and institutional pressures.225 Investigatory guidelines are therefore likely 
 
221. Ernest Young makes a similar point in noting that “[r]equiring the consent of mul-
tiple actors before the government can act is a pervasive institutional strategy in the Consti-
tution; it is most familiar, obviously, in separation of powers.” Young, supra note 137, at 
1289. He goes on to suggest that counterterrorism might be an area of public policy in which 
the federal government, notwithstanding its powerful levers of influence, “must still per-
suade state authorities that federal policy is sufficiently legitimate, wise, and fair to warrant 
their participation.” Id. at 1289-90. 
222. See ATTORNEY GENERAL’S GUIDELINES FOR DOMESTIC FBI OPERATIONS 7 (2008), 
available at http://www.justice.gov/ag/readingroom/guidelines.pdf. 
223. See Attorney General Guidelines for FBI Criminal Investigations, National Securi-
ty Investigations, and the Collection of Foreign Intelligence: Hearing Before the S. Select 
Comm. on Intelligence, 110th Cong. 2 (2008) (statement of Sen. John D. Rockefeller IV). 
224. See Waxman, supra note 8, at 386. 
225. See RATCLIFFE, supra note 71, at 229. 
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to be shaped by such locally diverse issues as resource allocation priorities and 
community relations.226 
When these sets of interests are overlaid by processes of interlevel collabo-
ration and mutual review, the need for officials at one level of government to 
persuade officials at the other can therefore serve a checking function. Al-
though it may carry costly inefficiencies in the short term, some friction be-
tween intelligence agencies at various levels of government resulting from 
these distinctive institutional perspectives may be useful for combating the 
“groupthink” and politicization of intelligence that can occur within entirely 
unified structures.227 And it is not just when state or local institutions resist 
federal efforts that their joint participation enhances such accountability: even 
when they cooperate, they provide localized feedback based on contextualized 
experience and community reactions to federal initiatives, including through 
dialogue among officials and by validating federal policy with continued or ad-
ditional local government contributions and support. Further consideration of 
institutional design should focus on the effects of vertical national security ar-
rangements on interlevel deliberative processes, with an eye toward how state 
and local involvement can provide genuine opportunities for joint planning and 
policy formulation and scrutiny—instead of states and localities merely follow-
ing the federal lead, as top-down accounts would predict, or occasionally work-
ing to block it, as pushback accounts would suggest. 
As discussed above, for instance, the emergent intelligence architecture in-
cludes mechanisms for collaborative investigation among federal and local 
agencies (for example, Joint Terrorism Task Forces) and efforts to involve state 
and local governments in intelligence sharing and analysis (including state or 
local fusion centers and interjurisdictional data-sharing initiatives).228 The fed-
eral government has recently been supplementing these programs with efforts 
to integrate state and local representatives into its intelligence planning, though 
it is too early to judge the results. For instance, the Interagency Threat Assess-
ment and Coordination Group at the National Counterterrorism Center, within 
the Office of the Director of National Intelligence, works specifically to pro-
vide advice and counsel to federal intelligence agencies about counterterrorism 
operations at the state and local levels.229 The Department of Homeland Securi-
ty has also set up an advisory council to help incorporate the views of state and 
 
226. See Richman, supra note 200, at 411-18. 
227. Cf. Anne Joseph O’Connell, The Architecture of Smart Intelligence: Structuring 
and Overseeing Agencies in the Post-9/11 World, 94 CALIF. L. REV. 1655, 1676-79 (2006) 
(discussing these advantages in the context of redundant rather than centralized intelligence 
agencies at the federal level). 
228. See supra Part I.C.2. 
229. See NATIONAL STRATEGY FOR INFORMATION SHARING: SUCCESSES AND 
CHALLENGES IN IMPROVING TERRORISM-RELATED INFORMATION SHARING 8 (2007), available 
at http://permanent.access.gpo.gov/lps90310/NSIS_book.pdf.  
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local agencies into information-sharing efforts.230 Evaluation of these programs 
should look beyond whether they adequately resource counterterrorism efforts 
or break down barriers to necessary information flows—the priority questions 
that most naturally and urgently followed from assessments of pre-9/11 bureau-
cratic defects in “connecting dots”231—to whether they promote meaningful 
opportunities for joint deliberation or mutual review between levels of govern-
ment involved in counterterrorism policy. 
Limited studies to date suggest, for example, that many joint task forces do 
not actually provide opportunities for serious intergovernmental deliberation 
because their decisionmaking tends to be dominated by their federal leadership, 
and participating state and local agents often become disconnected from their 
home agencies while not fully integrated with federal ones.232 That is, as cur-
rently configured the joint task forces neither adequately integrate local agen-
cies’ competencies nor allow sufficient feedback between local agencies and 
the federal ones that draw on their resources. Recent efforts by the Office of the 
Director of National Intelligence to involve state and local government repre-
sentatives in counterterrorism planning at the national level may prove better 
able to harness and integrate different perspectives in challenging assumptions 
and shaping policy. However, their impact is not yet clear, and it will be diffi-
cult for a small number of state and local representatives to help account for the 
diversity of concerns and experiences at that level.233 
It is likely that for these jointly reasoned deliberation mechanisms to work 
effectively over time, both local and federal agencies would have to commit to 
major cultural shifts as a matter of long-term strategy. For their part, state and 
local governments would need to purchase more clout by devoting substantial 
resources and senior-level attention to collaborative national security pro-
grams.234 It might require, for example, greater involvement of state and local 
personnel in joint task forces, and a restructuring of that participation to include 
more active and high-level dialogue between participating agents and their lo-
cal home agencies, along with a weightier voice in managing investigations and 
joint intelligence activities. For their part, and to make those investments 
worthwhile, federal agencies like the FBI would have to view local agencies as 
essential players and demonstrate that commitment with greater information 
 
230. See DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., FINAL REPORT: HOMELAND SECURITY INFORMATION 
NETWORK ADVISORY COMMITTEE MEETING, FEBRUARY 10-FEBRUARY 12, 2009, at 3 (2009), 
available at http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/hsinac_mtg_2009-2-1012.pdf. 
231. See supra note 64 and accompanying text. 
232. See Edward R. Maguire & William R. King, Federal-Local Coordination in Ho-
meland Security, in CRIMINOLOGISTS ON TERRORISM AND HOMELAND SECURITY 322, 346-49 
(Brian Forst et al. eds., 2011); Rascoff, supra note 161, at 1742-44. 
233. See INFO. SHARING ENV’T, REPORT ON THE INTERAGENCY THREAT ASSESSMENT 
AND COORDINATION GROUP (ITACG) 1-2 (2010), available at http://www.ise.gov/ 
sites/default/files/2010_ITACG_Report_Final_30Nov10.pdf; Rascoff, supra note 161, at 
1746-47. 
234. See Richman, supra note 200, at 419. 
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sharing and greater deference to local policy priorities.235 Whereas local police 
culture will need to evolve over time to see their activities as part of a broader 
national security system, the FBI culture will need to evolve away from seeing 
local police as second-class partners.236 
Any such tighter partnership creates some tension between direct political 
accountability and deliberative accountability, since greater integration of state 
and local efforts with federal ones may cause further blurring of lines of policy 
and even bureaucratic responsibility.237 Some top-down accounts critical of 
federal-local collaboration advocate strict separation of state and local agencies 
from federal national security efforts, fearing that overlap and integration of ac-
tivities results in local cooptation.238 Such strict separation is increasingly im-
practical, though, after a decade of investment in state and local counterterror-
ism programs and the federal government’s reliance on intelligence capacity at 
the state and local level—all of which could deepen if domestic terrorism 
threats grow. This analysis suggests instead that a more fruitful avenue to pre-
serving and harnessing the values of local deliberative input may be through 
expanded local participation in joint intelligence planning and deliberative de-
cisionmaking. 
3. Accountability oversight 
The danger to liberty, security, and other policy values in the national secu-
rity arena comes not only from where official policy and legal lines are drawn, 
but also from the likelihood that some government agencies or agents will cross 
or fail to meet those official lines.239 Because this is an area in which govern-
ment powers historically have been prone to abuse, and in which standard polit-
ical accountability mechanisms associated with federalism are undermined, 
oversight and monitoring mechanisms—another way to think about accounta-
bility—take on added import.240 
 
235. See Maguire & King, supra note 232, at 346-49. 
236. See George L. Kelling & William J. Bratton, Policing Terrorism, CIVIC BULL., 
Sept. 2006, at 6-7. 
237. Cf. Heather K. Gerken, The Supreme Court, 2009 Term—Foreword: Federalism 
All the Way Down, 124 HARV. L. REV. 4, 9 (2010) (“At the national level, we have two com-
peting accounts of how to check a government: (1) separation of powers, which depends on 
separation and independence, and (2) checks and balances, which depends on integration and 
interdependence.”). 
238. See supra Part II.A.1. 
239. In addition to thinking about national security oversight architecture in both the 
horizontal and vertical dimensions, there is a need to focus on the public-private axis, espe-
cially as the government becomes more reliant on the private sector to support intelligence 
efforts. See Jon D. Michaels, All the President’s Spies: Private-Public Intelligence Partner-
ships in the War on Terror, 96 CALIF. L. REV. 901, 904 (2008). 
240. “Accountability” is also often used in the national security context to mean moni-
tored compliance with the law. See, e.g., Stephen Dycus, The Role of Military Intelligence in 
Homeland Security, 64 LA. L. REV. 779, 807 (2004) (calling for “reliable controls and meas-
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There are reasons to be especially worried about oversight of national secu-
rity intelligence activities at the local level, where significant activities will 
continue to take place.241 First, recall from Part I the divergent histories of fed-
eral and local governments with respect to Cold War intelligence abuses and 
subsequent reform: whereas the federal government still had to bear responsi-
bility for combating domestic national security threats, and so developed a set 
of formal checks, local governments could and did largely retreat from national 
security intelligence activities during the late Cold War reform period.242 As a 
result, governmental intelligence oversight mechanisms are considerably less 
mature and developed at the state and local level, and they are very patchy and 
uneven across jurisdictions.243 
A second reason to worry especially about local oversight of national secu-
rity activities is that even policing oversight mechanisms that do exist and may 
generally operate well at the local level are often poorly adapted to government 
activities with very low public transparency. Recall also from the previous 
Subpart that visibility of police behavior and programs normally plays a major 
role in regulating coercive or invasive government conduct at the local level, 
but that intelligence activities are often not widely or easily detectable.244 
(Many traditional police functions also include surreptitious activities, such as 
criminal wiretapping, but those—much more so than intelligence programs and 
practices—are often overseen by courts or governed by well-honed internal 
guidelines.) With respect to surveillance of potential national security threats 
and other publicly imperceptible intelligence activities, some states have devel-
oped or are developing specialized audits and oversight boards.245 However, 
many state and local governments lack sophisticated internal controls, and leg-
islatures and courts at those levels generally lack expertise and resources to 
conduct rigorous investigation or monitoring.246 If top-down accounts are cor-
rect that federal law and policy have mimetic effects at the state and local level, 
there is particular reason to worry that national security laws and policies de-
veloped at the federal level with federal oversight mechanisms in mind might 
be ill-suited for local governance, at least without added or improved checks, 
 
ures to provide accountability” for domestic military intelligence); Stephen J. Schulhofer, 
The New World of Foreign Intelligence Surveillance, 17 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 531, 538 
(2006) (discussing how Title III “promotes better accountability [than FISA] through a far 
stronger system of sanctions”).  
241. See Rascoff, supra note 161, at 1742 (“[L]ocal intelligence increasingly operates 
in a formal governance vacuum.”). 
242. See supra notes 45-49 and accompanying text. 
243. See BUREAU OF JUSTICE ASSISTANCE, supra note 45, at 19-20. 
244. See supra notes 207-10 and accompanying text.  
245. See RILEY ET AL., supra note 11, at 34, 45-49. 
246. See Symposium on Security, Technology and Individual Rights—2003, 2 GEO. J.L. 
& PUB. POL’Y 17, 76 (2004) (statement of Craig Burkhardt); Kennedy & Swire, supra note 
132, at 984. 
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given that local oversight mechanisms vary considerably across juris-
dictions.247 
Informal oversight mechanisms—such as investigative journalism and civil 
liberty watchdog groups—play a role in monitoring compliance with intelli-
gence law and policy at all levels of government as well, though reliance on in-
formal oversight raises its own set of questions with respect to vertical alloca-
tion of governmental responsibilities. Although it is widely believed that these 
actors have played a growing role in recent decades as a check on government 
national security powers, there tends to be little research or systematic study of 
whether such checks operate more or less strongly at the federal level versus 
the state and local level, or in what types of jurisdictions these checks are likely 
to be especially strong or weak.248 
If intelligence oversight is indeed underdeveloped or insufficiently robust 
at the state and local level—or within particular states and localities—how 
might vertical national security architecture help address those gaps? Several 
institutional structures are possible, and the appropriate choice among them de-
pends on a number of local factors, such as the degree to which informal 
checks operate, as well as the specific intelligence functions at issue. 
One approach is to rely on decentralized, or even localized, intelligence 
oversight. That is, state or local jurisdictions would be expected to develop, 
supplement, and retool their own oversight mechanisms—including internal 
agency review processes, legislative monitoring, and external audits—tailored 
to their particular interests, circumstances, and laws or guidelines. Some indi-
vidual states, for example, are in the process of developing and formalizing go-
vernance boards or other oversight bodies to monitor intelligence fusion center 
activities, and some cities have independent auditing processes to monitor intel-
ligence activities.249 An obvious downside of this approach is cost, as each ju-
risdiction would have to spend resources and develop the necessary expertise 
and experience. This approach therefore fits most naturally with a vision of lo-
 
247. In some cases, existing local oversight mechanisms can exercise strong checks. 
Mary Cheh studied the District of Columbia City Council’s investigation of tactics used by 
the D.C. police to disrupt mass protests in 2000-03 by, among other things, preemptively 
arresting large numbers of suspicious individuals. This local legislative oversight led to D.C. 
legislation imposing strict standards on police practices that threatened First Amendment 
rights. See Cheh, supra note 10, at 20-21. By contrast, a series of investigative journalist ac-
counts in 2011 of controversial NYPD surveillance practices pointed to weak formal over-
sight checks. See Samantha Gross & Matt Apuzzo, NYPD Grilled on Anti-Terror Efforts, 
NEWARK STAR-LEDGER, Oct. 7, 2011, at 2. 
248. Jerome Skolnick argues that a strong civil rights bar and free press are important 
checks on surveillance powers at the local level and that these checks are stronger or weaker 
in some jurisdictions than others. See Skolnick, supra note 125, at 210-12. Kennedy and 
Swire argue that, in general, the press and civil liberties organizations pose a stronger check 
at the federal level than at the state or local level. See Kennedy & Swire, supra note 132, at 
984. Intuitively I agree, but the federal government is also probably stronger in its ability to 
contest those forces.  
249. See RILEY ET AL., supra note 11, at 34; ROLLINS, supra note 97, at 12. 
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calism, in which state and local governments play a strong role in setting law 
and policy within their jurisdiction, and with national security functions in 
which some state and local governments might be willing to invest and engage 
heavily. For example, the approach is well-suited for activities like police in-
vestigations and threat monitoring, which are—as noted above and discussed 
further in the next Subpart—often context-specific, subject to diverse laws and 
guidelines, and difficult to oversee from afar because they do not produce me-
trics that are easy to assess or compare across jurisdictions.250 These are also 
intelligence activities that are not neatly separable from regular policing      
functions. 
Another approach is to rely on the federal government to provide some 
centralized oversight. Whereas a decentralized or localized approach would ac-
commodate or even encourage variation of monitoring mechanisms, this ap-
proach would do the opposite, concentrating oversight in existing mechanisms 
at the federal level (such as agency inspectors general) or promoting adherence 
to federal oversight standards through reporting and federal auditing. As men-
tioned earlier, many federal programs that build intelligence analysis and shar-
ing capacity at the state and local level condition receipt of federal funds and 
resources on compliance with federal regulations and guidelines,251 though the 
federal government does not generally take on complete responsibility for mon-
itoring compliance. This centralized approach is probably best suited for pro-
grams like intelligence fusion centers that are administered mostly at the state 
level (to reduce the number of government units to be monitored) and that gen-
erate products or data, such as intelligence assessments or compiled data-
sharing records, which could be audited from Washington on a periodic basis. 
These are just a few among many factors that should shape intelligence 
oversight structures. Other combinations of centralized or decentralized and 
federal or local controls also exist. For example, the 1970s and 1980s federal 
court consent decrees limiting some major cities’ intelligence programs, men-
tioned earlier, were a form of federal but decentralized control.252 At the most 
general level, an important implication is that possible roles for local agencies 
in national security intelligence cannot be meaningfully assessed in terms of 
liberty, security, and other policy values independent of the institutional-
oversight context in which they will take place. The result is that intelligence 
oversight, like the functions it monitors, should remain a combination of feder-
al top-down and local bottom-up efforts, requiring some disaggregation of in-
telligence functions based in part on concerns about costs. The next Subpart 
takes a closer look at some of these economics. 
 
250. Cf. OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GEN., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, IMPROVING THE OFFICE 
OF COMMUNITY ORIENTED POLICING SERVICES’ GRANT AWARDING, MONITORING, AND 
PROGRAM EVALUATION PROCESSES 8-9 (2009) (discussing limited capacity for oversight of 
local grant programs due to resource constraints). 
251. See, e.g., RILEY ET AL., supra note 11, at 62. 
252. See supra note 45 and accompanying text. 
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B. The Economics of National Security as Regulation 
Besides a focus on accountability, another common federalism perspective 
emphasizes efficiency and the distribution of costs, and the economics of regu-
latory federalism provide an additional analytic lens through which to examine 
institutional design of intelligence architecture.253 This view holds that authori-
ty should be allocated among levels of government to maximize welfare, often 
focusing on questions of externalities and the costs and benefits of uniformity 
versus variation. Such analysis is especially helpful when disaggregating na-
tional security intelligence into its component functions (such as collection, 
analysis, and sharing) and thinking about which should be set and regulated 
with strong top-down federal influence versus bottom-up localism. 
1. Intelligence law and policy as regulation 
Consider, by way of analogy, pollution regulation. Federal policymaking 
may be seen as necessary because states have an incentive to underspend on 
environmental protection, especially if the deleterious effects of environmental 
damage are felt elsewhere across borders, as “spillover effects.”254 Those who 
favor localized environmental regulation often respond that interjurisdictional 
competition could pressure governments to regulate efficiently.255 There are 
also policy advantages to uniformity to be weighed against efficiencies gener-
ated through localized tailoring and experimentation with practices and laws. 
Intelligence efforts, including collecting and sharing information, can be 
thought of as a form of regulation of harmful activity (terrorism-related activi-
ties that threaten national security), in which the level or intensity of regulation 
comes at a cost (for example, privacy or other liberties, resources, and so forth). 
With regard to the economics of national security intelligence, there is probably 
no realistic, comparable danger of a “race to the bottom” in which states are 
discouraged from adopting optimal environmental protection levels due to 
commercial competition with other states.256 Even the most privacy-protective 
state or city would not want to risk becoming a terrorist refuge, though that is 
not to say that some states or cities would not pride themselves publicly on 
their strong commitment to certain rights or as privacy beacons. Nor is there 
 
253. Cf. Rascoff, supra note 45, at 616-19 (arguing for a cost-benefit evaluation of in-
telligence architecture). 
254. On environmental pollution spillover effects across state borders, see Richard L. 
Revesz, The Race to the Bottom and Federal Environmental Regulation: A Response to Crit-
ics, 82 MINN. L. REV. 535, 538 (1997); Richard B. Stewart, Pyramids of Sacrifice? Problems 
of Federalism in Mandating State Implementation of National Environmental Policy, 86 
YALE L.J. 1196, 1215-16 (1977). 
255. See Revesz, supra note 254, at 535-36. 
256. See Stewart, supra note 254, at 1212.  
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evidence that suggests terrorists or their supporters locate themselves or their 
activities based on assessments of locally varying security law and policy.257 
No doubt, too, some state and local governments have been eager to invest 
in many counterterrorism activities and programs, especially those that carry 
visible cachet or power.258 Furthermore, many state and local jurisdictions that 
likely face low risk of terrorism have probably overinvested in counterterrorism 
programs, and federal programs to promote or support state and local counter-
terrorism efforts have been criticized as needlessly overspending in many low-
risk locales.259 Like other federal spending programs, homeland security and 
counterterrorism include their share of wasteful pork projects.260 
However, it is also likely that some states and localities would be inclined 
absent federal intervention to spend too little (in terms of resources, liberties, 
etc.) on intelligence or other national security functions—or at least on some 
types of intelligence and national security functions—because of the way costs 
and benefits are distributed.261 Much of the risk from states or localities unde-
rinvesting in counterterrorism intelligence is externalized for several reasons. 
First, the political fallout of terrorist attacks is likely to land heavily on the fed-
eral government, because (for now, at least) it is widely viewed as primarily—
even if not exclusively—responsible for stopping any terrorist attack.262 
Second, some of the high costs of intelligence are borne locally, in forms like 
added surveillance and processing of information, and with little visible and 
measurable benefit.263 Yet much of the benefits of local intelligence accrues 
elsewhere, because terrorist attacks may take place far away (maybe even in a 
different country) from where they are planned, coordinated, funded, and so 
forth.264 A terrorist attack anywhere then carries tremendous costs for the entire 
country in terms of fear, economic dislocation, and other reverberating effects 
 
257. But cf. CHRISTOPHER DICKEY, SECURING THE CITY 170-71 (2009) (suggesting that 
aggressive counterterrorism efforts in New York City might cause terrorists to relocate to 
New Jersey or other areas). 
258. Cf. Dreyfuss, supra note 123, at 12-14 (reporting post-9/11 efforts by police agen-
cies to expand their power).  
259. See David Johnston, With Crime Up, a City’s Police Force Questions the Focus on 
Terror, N.Y. TIMES, July 24, 2008, at A17 (describing the increased counterterrorism in-
vestment in Providence, Rhode Island, and the attendant criticism from police officials); 
Schmitt & Johnston, supra note 126. 
260. See Editorial, Risk vs. Pork, WASH. POST, May 17, 2005, at A20. 
261. See Michael A. Sheehan, Op-Ed., The Terrorist Next Door, N.Y. TIMES, May 4, 
2010, at A31 (discussing local government reluctance to invest in some counterterrorism in-
telligence functions). 
262. See Richman, supra note 200, at 408 (observing that, after 9/11, the federal en-
forcement bureaucracy was “saddled with a politically unavoidable, and all-but-impossible, 
responsibility: preventing another such attack”). 
263. Even the political rewards of successful counterterrorism intelligence are unlikely 
to accrue to local governments, because most terrorism prosecutions quickly become federa-
lized. 
264. See Thacher, supra note 84, at 637-38. 
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of terroristic violence. Third, some cities are likely to see themselves as facing 
an especially low risk of terrorism, and this view could affect their willingness 
to bear costs of shared or interlinked programs. Taking the earlier example of 
Portland, that city might have decided to spend little on intelligence (in terms of 
resources as well as liberty and privacy) because it assessed that any threats 
emanating from its area were unlikely, and was therefore unwilling to invest in 
the federally led joint task force.265 
Importantly, the legal and policy decisions taken by state and local gov-
ernments do not entirely set the level of liberty, security, and other values felt 
in a given jurisdiction. However much a state or local government might with-
draw from counterterrorism activities or collaboration, the federal government 
still operates within local jurisdictions—perhaps even more so to compensate 
for state or local inaction. This points to a weakness in arguments that state and 
local governments should separate themselves from national security activities 
and programs to better protect their public policy domain from federal distor-
tions. It is also similar to a point made by Justice Stevens in his Printz dissent: 
“By limiting the ability of the Federal Government to enlist state officials in the 
implementation of its programs, the Court creates incentives for the National 
Government to aggrandize itself [through] . . . vast national bureaucracies to 
implement its policies.”266 In other words, a strategy by local governments of 
distancing themselves from federal efforts may be successful in assuring that 
local government actions reflect their own policy choices about liberty, securi-
ty, and other priorities. But such a strategy may not necessarily reflect how 
those choices are ultimately felt by their citizenry or how national security ef-
forts affect other policies. This is because the federal government can step in 
where local governments insist on leaving off, and impacted communities may 
not discern which level of government is responsible. Indeed, as argued above, 
local withdrawal from federal efforts may forfeit opportunities to influence fed-
eral activities conducted there.267 
Although many incentives point toward the possibility that—absent federal 
intervention—some states and localities would underspend on national security, 
the opposite is also possible, especially in areas that perceive themselves as es-
pecially threatened. New York City, for example, might decide to spend very 
heavily on intelligence—perhaps even more heavily in some respects than the 
federal government would prefer—because it remains a prime target and be-
cause attacks there are likely to carry immense local costs.268 In 2008, New 
 
265. See Herman, supra note 148 and accompanying text.  
266. Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 959 (1997) (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
267. See supra Part III.A.2. 
268. Courts recognize that New York City faces unique terrorism challenges and dan-
gers. Besides the case involving its investigatory guidelines, see supra notes 134-36 and ac-
companying text, a good illustration is the NYPD’s random search policy for subway riders, 
which the Second Circuit upheld based in part on New York’s “continued desirability as a 
target.” MacWade v. Kelly, 460 F.3d 260, 272 (2d Cir. 2006). 
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York City Police Commissioner Ray Kelly complained vigorously to U.S. At-
torney General Michael Mukasey that the Justice Department was using too 
strict a legal standard in considering intelligence wiretaps and other electronic 
surveillance.269 This might be viewed as a rare example of local pushback 
aimed at federal counterterrorism policy deemed too protective of liberty. In 
response to New York City’s urging the federal government to be more aggres-
sive in seeking foreign intelligence wiretaps in its area, the U.S. Attorney Gen-
eral retorted that doing so might undermine security in other parts of the coun-
try (as well as New York) by eroding the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance 
Court’s confidence in executive controls for wiretap applications.270 In other 
words, the federal government argued, New York City’s preferred policies 
would produce high costs widely dispersed elsewhere. 
Viewed in this light, one way to think about federal programs to promote, 
support, or link state and local intelligence efforts is that the federal govern-
ment has an interest—and should play a role—in ensuring that states and locali-
ties provide at least a minimum threshold of both security and liberty.271 In 
terms of security, the federal government should work to ensure that states and 
localities prevent national security threats from acting or growing within their 
jurisdictions. It should help avoid what might crudely be thought of as “domes-
tic safe havens” for terrorists or terrorist supporters in particular locales, be-
cause even if a state or locality were to discount heavily the harms that might 
result, those harms may have national-level effects, or even spillover effects 
across borders.272 In terms of liberty, the federal government should work to 
ensure that states and localities protect civil liberties at least as much as re-
quired by the Federal Constitution or federal law, not only as an interest in it-
self but also because even localized violations of rights by states and localities 
in the name of national security could undermine political support for nation-
wide federal national security policies. 
Working to assure minimum floors of security and liberty in each subfe-
deral jurisdiction, however, still probably leaves a lot of room for localism in 
between. There will still be a zone in which states or localities should appro-
priately have discretion to set balances according to their own assessments of 
costs, including costs to other policy priorities. As an example of how this op-
 
269. See Letter from Raymond W. Kelly, Comm’r, N.Y.C. Police Dep’t, to Michael 
Mukasey, U.S. Attorney Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Justice (Oct. 27, 2008), available at http://    
online.wsj.com/public/resources/documents/Mukasey111908.pdf.  
270. See David Johnston & William K. Rashbaum, New York Police Fight with U.S. on 
Surveillance, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 20, 2008, at A1. 
271. See William W. Buzbee, Federal Floors, Ceilings, and the Benefits of Federal-
ism’s Institutional Diversity, in PREEMPTION CHOICE: THE THEORY, LAW, AND REALITY OF 
FEDERALISM’S CORE QUESTION 98, 100-14 (William W. Buzbee ed., 2008).  
272. Cf. Mazzone, supra note 22, at 39-47 (arguing that federal powers over national 
defense were designed to solve collective action problems among the newly independent 
states). 
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erates in practice with regard to information collection and sharing: The federal 
government has promulgated minimum privacy standards for compiling, re-
cording, and accessing in a common database “suspicious activity reports” on 
certain types of observed activities that might fit terrorism profiles. However, 
the federal government has left participating local jurisdictions with substantial 
room to adjust policies and procedures for such reporting based on local condi-
tions and state and local law.273 
With regard to information analysis, too, some state fusion center activities 
are governed by federal regulations requiring compliance with federally man-
dated operating principles and standards,274 and the Department of Justice also 
publishes fusion center guidelines for operational issues as well as privacy and 
civil liberty protection.275 Yet fusion centers have taken a variety of forms in 
different states based on local assessment of needs and policy priorities, and 
they are also governed by a variety of state laws.276 As the Department of Ho-
meland Security reported in its 2008 Privacy Impact Assessment: “No two fu-
sion centers define or carry out their missions in exactly the same way or are 
subject to the same authorities or regulations. Notions of comity and federal-
ism, moreover, prohibit the Department from placing certain requirements on 
fusion centers.”277 Federal guidelines, though, encourage states to appoint a 
chief privacy officer for each fusion center. These privacy officers help ensure 
compliance with federal standards as well as state law and policy standards, 
and they also serve as liaisons with civil liberties and other community organi-
zations to help mold policies and practices to local priorities.278 
2. Uniformity and variation of intelligence law and policy 
Such unevenness across jurisdictions in calibrating policy raises another set 
of federalism economics concerns, though: the balance of uniformity and varia-
tion. It is well remembered that Justice Brandeis touted “the happy incident[] of 
 
273. See Philip Leggiere, Fusion Centers: Tough Tightrope, HOMELAND SECURITY 
TODAY (Jan. 3, 2011), http://www.hstoday.us/index.php?id=3392&no_cache=1&tx_ttnews 
%5Btt_news%5D=16211. 
274. See ROLLINS, supra note 97, at 13-14. 
275. See Fusion Center Guidelines: Developing and Sharing Information and Intelli-
gence in a New Era, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, OFFICE OF JUSTICE PROGRAMS (Aug. 2006), 
http://it.ojp.gov/documents/fusion_center_guidelines.pdf. As of 2010, more than eighty per-
cent of the seventy-two fusion centers had submitted draft privacy policies to the federal 
government for review and technical assistance. INFO. SHARING ENV’T, ANNUAL REPORT TO 
THE CONGRESS 52 (2010).  
276. See generally Trip Jennings, Post-9/11 Intelligence Goes Local, N.M. INDEP. 
(Aug. 12, 2008, 3:00 AM), http://newmexicoindependent.com/481/post-911-intelligence       
-goes-local (describing fusion centers in the Southwest). 
277. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., DHS/ALL/PIA-011, PRIVACY IMPACT ASSESSMENT FOR 
THE DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY: STATE, LOCAL, AND REGIONAL FUSION CENTER 
INITIATIVE 2 (2008).  
278. See Leggiere, supra note 273. 
WAXMAN 64 STAN. L. REV. 289 (DO NOT DELETE) 2/16/2012 3:54 PM 
344 STANFORD LAW REVIEW [Vol. 64:289 
the federal system that a single courageous State may, if its citizens choose, 
serve as a laboratory,”279 but it is less well remembered that he spoke only of 
doing so “without risk to the rest of the country.”280 Institutional macrostruc-
ture should account for the risks and rewards, both locally and nationally, of 
local variation. 
In the regulatory context, the efficiency advantages of uniformity are 
usually thought to include predictability and reduced costs for regulated actors 
that operate across jurisdictional borders.281 In the national security intelligence 
context, top-down influences and pressures might similarly be defended in 
terms of promoting cross-jurisdictional cooperation or investigations that could 
be slowed or inhibited by conflicting rules, standards, and procedures. Such 
concerns are probably especially salient with respect to, for example, informa-
tion-sharing law, such as rules regulating contribution to and access to law en-
forcement and intelligence databases. The costs to government agencies in en-
suring compliance with a complex web of varying state and local data laws 
could be quite high, and experience to date suggests that states are unlikely on 
their own to coordinate effectively harmonized standards.282 Government-wide 
standards with respect to minimum security and privacy practices also help fa-
cilitate information sharing by promoting trust among different agencies that 
might otherwise lack confidence about others’ practices. Moreover, disparate 
standards on data sharing are especially likely to involve externalized costs 
(state A’s decision to withhold data from information-exchange networks to 
protect its residents’ privacy might increase security costs to neighboring state 
B) that will be unequally distributed depending on whether a state is particular-
ly likely to be targeted or particularly likely to include communities in which 
terrorism-related activities occur. 
Variation, however, may also offer short-term advantages in other aspects 
of national security intelligence, insofar as intelligence regulation can be tai-
lored to local conditions,283 and long-term advantages can be gained through 
experimentation and resulting adaptation of regulation.284 Consider the earlier 
 
279. New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissent-
ing). 
280. Id. 
281. See E. Donald Elliott et al., Toward a Theory of Statutory Evolution: The Federali-
zation of Environmental Law, 1 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 313, 325-26 (1985). 
282. See THE MARKLE FOUND. TASK FORCE ON NAT’L SEC. IN THE INFO. AGE, NATION AT 
RISK: POLICY MAKERS NEED BETTER INFORMATION TO PROTECT THE COUNTRY 5 (2009) (“In-
formation sharing outside the [intelligence community]—as well as information sharing 
across the law enforcement, domestic intelligence, and foreign intelligence communities—
remains problematic.”).  
283. Cf. Erin Ryan, Federalism and the Tug of War Within: Seeking Checks and Bal-
ance in the Interjurisdictional Gray Area, 66 MD. L. REV. 503, 581-82 (2007) (describing 
the benefits of such tailoring in the air pollution control context). 
284. See Michael C. Dorf & Charles F. Sabel, A Constitution of Democratic Experimen-
talism, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 267, 315-16 (1998). 
WAXMAN 64 STAN. L. REV. 289 (DO NOT DELETE) 2/16/2012 3:54 PM 
February 2012] NATIONAL SECURITY FEDERALISM 345 
example of federal programs to support state and local compilation, sharing, 
and analysis of suspicious activity reports.285 There, participating state and lo-
cal agencies have taken various approaches to improve public transparency and 
community outreach in developing their privacy-protection policies, including 
in some cases the direct involvement of local civil liberties advocacy groups.286 
The lessons learned and best practices drawn from these varied efforts are then 
fed back into federal programs to provide technical support and to periodically 
review state and local efforts, and they are also exchanged directly between 
states and localities through their own institutional networks.287 Although it is 
too early to judge results, over time these adaptation and reappraisal processes 
may be beneficial not only in improving policy effectiveness within federally 
set parameters, but also in readjusting those parameters (the federally set mini-
mum floors of liberty, security, and protection of other interests).288 
The long-term benefits of experimentation and adaptation are probably es-
pecially likely to arise with respect to some information collection activities, 
because the effectiveness of investigation practices and information-gathering 
strategies tends to be context-specific to different types of communities and lo-
cal government capabilities. The federal government has certain exclusive ca-
pabilities—such as technical capacities to monitor great quantities of electronic 
communications and vast networks of foreign contacts and counterparts arrayed 
across the globe—that are well suited to investigating transnational terrorist 
networks. But, as discussed earlier, local agencies have comparative advantages 
of their own: because of their continual presence and deep knowledge of local 
communities, local police are often better versed in local activities than are fed-
eral agents, and they have extensive networks of community relationships.289 
Some terrorist planning or supporting activities conducted inside the United 
States are therefore likely to be uncovered through resulting observations by 
local law enforcement and tips originating from relevant neighborhoods, or 
through innovative partnerships between the federal government and local 
agencies best positioned to design coherent information-gathering strategies at-
tuned to particular community conditions, available resources, and other polic-
 
285. See supra note 273 and accompanying text. 
286. See INFO. SHARING ENV’T, PRIVACY, CIVIL RIGHTS, AND CIVIL LIBERTIES ANALYSIS 
AND RECOMMENDATIONS: NATIONWIDE SUSPICIOUS ACTIVITY REPORTING INITIATIVE 25-26 
(2010), available at www.ise.gov/sites/default/files/NSI_PCRCL_Analysis_July2010.pdf. 
287. See id. at 17-19; Felisa Cardona, Fusion Conference Brings In Officers Nation-
wide, DENV. POST, Mar. 14, 2011, at A12. 
288. Cf. Buzbee, supra note 271, at 113-14 (arguing that federal floors may promote ef-
fective experimentalism in areas of risk regulation). 
289. See supra notes 69-72 and accompanying text. Some experts worry, however, that 
counterterrorism and national security intelligence responsibilities will crowd out other tradi-
tional police functions or will undermine police-community relations. See Ellen Scrivner, 
The Impact of September 11 on Community Policing, in COMMUNITY POLICING: THE PAST, 
PRESENT, AND FUTURE 183, 186-88 (Lorie Fridell & Mary Ann Wycoff eds., 2004). 
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ing and local government activities.290 These comparative advantages can seed 
long-term, bottom-up learning. 
C. The Future of National Security Federalism and Counterterrorism 
Intelligence 
In sum, applying some common analytic frameworks of federalism to na-
tional security intelligence brings to the foreground issues otherwise obscured 
or neglected by the standard narratives of liberty versus security and by narra-
tives of states as following versus checking federal power. Thinking about ver-
tical national security architecture in terms of accountability mechanisms and 
efficiencies—and considering those federalism frameworks in terms of the 
unique features of national security intelligence—does not settle debates about 
security architecture. It does, however, inform them and open up new avenues 
of inquiry that should guide decisions about federal-local collaboration and 
structural design. 
Returning to a concluding point of Part II, counterterrorism strategy—and 
therefore macrostructural design—will need to evolve as the threat does, espe-
cially if that threat includes a growing domestic component.291 To be sure, a 
vast proportion of the terrorism threat will continue to have foreign dimensions 
and origins, and many aspects of counterterrorism intelligence will require cen-
tralized federal control and high degrees of uniformity—even if they also nec-
essarily involve coordination with local agencies. Take, for example, govern-
ment decisions to intervene and arrest suspected members of terrorist networks 
or cells that have plotted attacks but are not yet ready to carry them out, versus 
continuing to monitor the plotters and their communications to glean more in-
telligence about their ideology, contacts, travel, and recruitment. Besides tap-
ping into local agencies for operational support, these decisions may require 
notification and coordination with local governments. Such coordination is 
needed to ensure that local law enforcement agents do not inadvertently tip off 
suspects prematurely, and also because local governments have a strong inter-
est in public safety among communities in which plotters may be residing or 
traveling.292 Generally these decisions require strong top-down control, though, 
because the federal government is best positioned to assess interlinkages to 
 
290. See Joshua D. Freilich et al., Surveying American State Police Agencies About 
Terrorism Threats, Terrorism Sources, and Terrorism Definitions, 21 TERRORISM & POL. 
VIOLENCE 450, 452 (2009); see also Stephen J. Schulhofer et al., American Policing at a 
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other investigations and foreign intelligence operations, as well as intelligence 
gains and risks that may be long-term and widely distributed. 
Especially if the terrorist threat becomes more decentralized and frag-
mented, however, some institutional arrangements for combating it will also 
need to become more localized and adaptive. Consider by way of concluding 
examples two looming and interrelated sets of issues, each alluded to earlier, 
for which the analytic frames of this Part will be useful in understanding and 
designing vertical institutional relationships: government efforts to detect and 
address patterns of violent radicalization, and the use of certain information-
gathering techniques such as confidential informants. Both have long-term stra-
tegic policy and day-to-day operational import, and both cut across intelligence 
collection, analysis, and sharing. 
As to addressing violent radicalization, a burgeoning school of thought 
holds that if domestic terrorism threats grow, then deep engagement of police 
and other government agencies with local publics could become even more im-
portant. Such engagement could help not just in developing relationships of 
trust needed to acquire information about potential threats from community 
members, but also in directing resources and efforts against the problems that 
contribute to violent extremism or terrorist recruitment by religious communi-
ties and others.293 To address these issues, the federal government is working 
to expand its outreach efforts toward some Muslim and Middle Eastern immi-
grant communities, and to develop a stronger knowledge base about radicaliza-
tion and counter-radicalization processes.294 Meanwhile, some city police de-
partments are also working to build ties with local religious, ethnic, and 
immigrant communities to better understand their activities and identify pock-
ets of extremism within them.295 
Lessons from European countries more experienced in dealing with domes-
tic terrorism threats and pockets of violent extremism among certain minority 
communities suggest that local governments are often better positioned than 
national ones to design and implement strategies for countering violent-
extremist ideology and recruitment, but that counter-radicalization and national 
security intelligence efforts are difficult to meld because perceptions about the 
latter may erode trust among communities who see themselves as targeted.296 
Given their broader community protection and service mandate, in many places 
local police—as well as other local government agencies and institutions—can 
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probably serve as a better bridge between counter-radicalization and national 
security intelligence activities than could their federal counterparts,297 though 
skeptics argue that where local law enforcement agencies are poorly informed 
and harbor ethnic or religious biases their efforts to identify and intervene to 
address radicalization processes are especially likely to backfire and infringe 
rights.298 
Rather than taking a lead role or pushing for top-down standardization, 
when it comes to efforts to counter violent radicalization, the federal govern-
ment’s most effective role may be in funding local initiatives, facilitating the 
spread of programs bred from diverse local experience, and sharing information 
about best practices developed by state and municipal governments for building 
relationships with community actors (educational, religious, and others) to 
yield information about threats and address their incipient formation.299 Local 
accountability mechanisms based on transparency and informal checks, includ-
ing scrutiny from civil liberties organizations and open dialogue with religious 
and ethnic minority groups, will therefore be especially important to check 
overstepping and to bolster rigorous deliberation informed both by federal ex-
pertise and by local understanding of complex community relationships. 
As to the closely related issue of intelligence-gathering methods, such as 
recruiting and running confidential informants—say, sending a recruited com-
munity member into a local mosque to observe activities within it—decisions 
about whether and how to use these methods raise issues of prioritizing and ba-
lancing a range of interests, such as detecting terrorist threats and protecting 
spheres of association and expression.300 Those decisions also implicate some 
interests of particular and varying salience at a local level, such as cultivating 
and maintaining trust and cooperation between law enforcement agencies and 
minority communities—trust and cooperation that could be threatened by these 
tactics.301 
To the extent that local governments want to protect those relationships—
not only from a counterterrorism perspective but perhaps more urgently for lo-
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cal policing, as necessary to provide public order and services—simply opting 
out of using informants may be of little help if the federal government contin-
ues to use them. Targeted communities may not distinguish among which level 
of government is surveilling them. With regard to promoting accountability and 
protecting local interests from costly burdens of federal initiatives, then, institu-
tional separation of federal and local policymaking in this context is of little 
value. Instead, the solution probably lies in joint policymaking within state and 
local jurisdictions and at the national level, recognizing that the federal gov-
ernment also has a significant long-term interest in winning and maintaining 
the support of local agencies and thereby gaining their knowledge of communi-
ties and sources of information within them. Promising approaches include ex-
panded local roles in joint task forces at the state and major urban area levels, 
which would still be federally led but would include a more substantial state 
and local role, and expanded local representative input to federal investigatory 
guidelines of the sort discussed in Part III.A.2. 
 
*   *   * 
 
Domestic counterterrorism architecture is still very much a work in 
progress, even if the major post-9/11 structures—federal bureaucratic reorgani-
zation, collaborative arrangements and grant programs linking federal agencies 
with state and local partners, etc.—are now in place. The policy choices men-
tioned above and the institutional arrangements for implementing them are just 
a few among many possible examples that together show that our federal na-
tional security system will remain a mix of centralization, decentralization, and 
localization, but that opportunities and challenges exist with respect to how 
they are combined, leveraged, and checked. 
Although it has shown resilience so far, on account of the deep roots of 
American local policing and some of the advantages it brings to counterterror-
ism efforts, the localization of some features of American counterterrorism ar-
chitecture could face intense centralization pressures in the future if the fre-
quency of terrorist attacks within the United States increases—especially if 
future terrorist attacks were to expose major breakdowns in cooperation or 
communication between the federal and local governments or among local 
governments.302 The issues explored in this Article are therefore important not 
only for guiding the sorts of policy questions just discussed and the continued 
evolution and reform of the current post-9/11 institutional architecture—
especially its vertical dimension—but also for informing possible future debate 
about radical alternatives. 
 
302. Cf. Eli Lake, Intelligence Agencies Slammed over Christmas Plot, WASH. TIMES, 
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regarding December 2009 airline bombing attempt). 
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CONCLUSION 
 The overwhelming focus on national security law scholarship centers on 
federal liberty-security balances and the horizontal relationships among federal 
branches of government. Events since 9/11, however, warrant attention to the 
uneven, textured national security law landscape formed by law and policy set 
at the state and local level, and also to the vertical relationships among the le-
vels of government. 
A federalism frame reveals how vertical intergovernmental structures could 
be reformed to enhance reasoned deliberation and oversight of intelligence and, 
especially when considering specific counterterrorism intelligence functions, to 
set policy-appropriate balances of centralization and localization. Such analysis 
is important because for the foreseeable future, state and local governments will 
play a significant role in counterterrorism intelligence, and that role may even 
grow. Harnessing state and local institutions for national security purposes will 
be essential to addressing parts of the national security challenge for which they 
are better suited than the federal government, especially if the terrorism threat 
evolves to include a greater domestic component. 
